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ABSTRACT 
 
Safeguards Envelope Methodology. (December 2011) 
Richard Royce Metcalf, B.S.; M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Pavel Tsvetkov 
 
Nuclear safeguards are intrinsic and extrinsic features of a facility which reduce 
probability of the successful acquisition of special nuclear material (SNM) by hostile actors. 
Future bulk handling facilities in the United States will include both domestic and 
international safeguards as part of a voluntary agreement with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. A new framework for safeguards, the Safeguards Envelope Methodology, is 
presented. A safeguards envelope is a set of operational and safeguards parameters that 
define a range, or “envelope,” of operating conditions that increases confidence as to the 
location and assay of nuclear material without increasing costs from security or safety. 
Facilities operating within safeguards envelopes developed by this methodology will operate 
with a higher confidence, a lower false alarm rate, and reduced safeguards impact on the 
operator. Creating a safeguards envelope requires bringing together security, safety, and 
safeguards best practices. This methodology is applied to an example facility, the Idaho 
Chemical Processing Plant. An example diversion scenario in the front-end of this nuclear 
reprocessing facility, using actual operating data, shows that the diversion could have been 
detected more easily by changing operational parameters, and these changed operational 
parameters would not sacrifice the operational efficiency of the facility, introduce security 
vulnerabilities, or create a safety hazard.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND PREVIOUS WORK 
Introduction 
Modern nuclear reprocessing facilities are crucial to the sustainment of nuclear power 
beyond the existing uranium reserves. The United States' current policy is a once-through 
fuel cycle, but the U.S. has experimented with large pilot-scale reprocessing facilities and 
may revisit civilian nuclear fuel reprocessing. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
France, Japan, India, and South Korea, have pursued reprocessing nuclear fuel for their 
civilian fuel cycles.  
Because these facilities are so crucial to the nuclear fuel cycle, and some of the 
countries listed above rely very heavily on nuclear power for their base-load needs, it is 
reasonable to expect that these facilities would be optimized in every way. Unfortunately this 
is not the case. The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) in Japan, based on the reprocessing 
technology used at the La Hague Plant in France and adapted by AREVA1, has not been 
designed with safeguardsi or security in mind. These facilities are ultimately chemical 
facilities, and so they have been designed with the toolbox of the chemical engineer: safety, 
reliability, and chemical efficiency.  
Prior work has explained the idea of "Safeguards by Design," integration of the 
safeguards and security of a facility into the early design phases, but no facility has used this 
methodology. Even facilities currently being built in the United States are not designed with 
                                                 
This dissertation follows in the style of Nuclear Technology. 
 
i
 The author recognizes the term safeguards to mean, in this case, both domestic (security/materials control) and 
international (protection from state-based theft). The author refers primarily to domestic safeguards, with an 
expectation in the United States that domestic safeguards will include international safeguards requirements 
pursuant with the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.  
2 
 
 
 
safeguards and security in mind, which will force expensive retrofitting. A significant aspect 
of this cost is the loss of efficiency due to safeguards requirements. Furthermore, these 
retrofits often relate only to stops in a process for materials control and accountability.  
This research offers a different method for the integration of safeguards and security 
into nuclear reprocessing facilities. Similar to the idea of an operating safety envelope, a 
safeguards envelope can be created to define the bounds of operating conditions to maximize 
the ability of a safeguards engineer or safeguards inspector to verify that no material has been 
removed. This methodology represents a departure from prior safeguards methods, in that 
operations and safeguards are directly linked and impact each other during production. 
Nuclear safeguards are intrinsic and extrinsic features of a facility which reduce probability 
of the successful acquisition of special nuclear material (SNM) by hostile actors. The term 
”domestic safeguards” typically refers to an all-threat scenario and includes physical security 
aspects, while international safeguards are only concerned about the host state as the hostile 
actor. Future bulk handling facilities in the United States will include both domestic and 
international safeguards as part of a voluntary agreement with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). A safeguards envelope is a set of operational and safeguards 
parameters that define a range, or “envelope,” of operating conditions that increases 
confidence as to the location and assay of nuclear material. This methodology focuses on the 
integration of safeguards and security in such a way to make the operation of the facility a 
"free variable" in optimizing the safeguards while minimizing impact to the facility.  
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Outline 
Chapter I includes the introduction, outline, brief on safeguards applied in nuclear 
systems (with a focus on reprocessing) and a review of prior work in this area of research. 
Chapter II describes the safeguards envelope methodology in detail, including the options for 
optimization depending on the safety and security analysis already performed in the given 
nuclear facility. Chapter III describes this methodology applied to the front end of a nuclear 
reprocessing facility in the United States.  
 
Nuclear Safeguards as a Requirement in Nuclear Systems  
Nuclear phenomena are irreversibly tied to nuclear weapons. The most significant 
advances in the creation of early nuclear reactors, the first large-scale fuel reprocessing, and 
the billions of dollars of research into transuranic chemistry were all related to nuclear 
weapons. Other industrial facilities such as chemical treatment plants have no such 
requirements, making safeguards a nuclear-industry specific requirement.  
In the first generations of the fuel cycle, it was often believed that the nuclear fuel 
cycle would be out of reach of all but the most advanced of nations. Effectively, nuclear 
civilian uses were derived from military applications, and so it was an absurd notion that 
nuclear material needed to be safeguarded. In the modern era, nuclear power has become a 
reliable part of the energy security of states which do not have nuclear weapons. South 
Korea, for example, exports nuclear technology and construction components for the 
Westinghouse AP1000 design while Japanese Steel Works is one of the few other companies 
that makes nuclear-grade pressure vessels.  
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Traditional pressurized-water and boiling-water reactors are not difficult to safeguard. 
Containment and surveillance (C/S) and tagging are the most common safeguard 
mechanisms because the large fuel assemblies can be counted. Gross partial defects (removal 
of a significant portion of the plutonium-bearing pins) can be detected using digital or 
analogue Cerenkov viewing devices. The technology needed to safeguard these facilities and 
the impact of safeguards on the operational viability (economic cost) is stabilized and 
reasonably low, so there is little remaining research in this area, minus a few glaring faults. 
Actual measurement of plutonium, for detecting partial-defect pin removal, remains a 
significant challenge, especially at the accuracy and efficiency required under modern 
safeguards.  
Similar to the way nuclear-reactor technology has proliferated through the world, 
nuclear reprocessing, in the form of both aqueous and pyroprocessing, has undergone a 
resurgence of research and interest. The prestige of owning and operating a nuclear reactor is 
not sufficient, and countries are seeking to gain total energy security through building nuclear 
reprocessing capabilities or facilities. Japan, a country with very limited natural energy 
resources, constructed such a reprocessing facility, the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). 
The Rokkasho facility requires disproportionate resources to safeguard compared to the 
many nuclear reactors around the world, an unfortunate but expected consequence of the 
difficulty in safeguarding bulk-handling facilities.  
Nuclear reprocessing facilities differ significantly from nuclear reactors: the material 
that is handled is diluted significantly into a bulk form, the most attractive material is 
separated from fission products, the pathway for material in the facility is not one-way, and 
material tends to accrete on the pipes (holdup). Bulk facilities are (on average) much more 
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difficult to safeguard compared to item facilities because the amount of material that can be 
removed is no longer discrete. This variable removal makes detection much more difficult: 
item accounting facilities can test explicitly to determine the detection probability and failure 
rates of their detector systems, but the added variable (theft amount) makes this much more 
difficult in reprocessing facilities. While concrete requirements exist for detection of the 
amount of material removed in a particular material balance period (MBP), diverting or 
stealing material over several MBPs is significantly more difficult to detect. Detection is also 
more challenging because, in some areas of most reprocessing facility designs, the most 
attractive materials2 are isolated without fission products, reducing the viability of gross 
containment/surveillance systems to detect the removal of the material. In other areas of the 
facility, curium and (, n) reactions dominate the neutron signature so strongly that 
plutonium cannot be discriminated. These signatures are also taken under extreme gamma-
load: while high energy gamma sources can be easily discriminated, the repair, maintenance, 
and calibration of these detectors becomes extremely difficult. And all of this occurs using a 
baseline measurement that occurs at an accountancy tank several steps into the process, after 
a recycle for the primary solvent of these facilities (nitric acid) has been reintegrated into the 
system. The flow of materials is not one-way: solvents are reused to minimize waste, but this 
provides an opportunity for removal of poorly scrubbed solvent that bears plutonium. This 
multi-solvent recycle also adds miles of piping, valves, and other potential extraction points 
from which to siphon off valuable material. Finally, bulk materials tend to get "held-up" 
inside of the facility. Though constituent materials from which reprocessing facilities are 
built are designed to resist the accretion of  of material on their walls, the entire periodic table 
exists in the dissolutions, and partially dissolved solids mixed with saturated nitric acid 
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naturally will plate out in the facility. This unavoidable holdup presents as material that 
simply disappears. Measurement of this holdup, inside one of the most radioactive 
environments on the planet, provides a significant challenge.  
Early reprocessing facilities, from which almost all others have been copied, were 
designed and maintained by chemical and industrial engineers. The emphasis was on the final 
product and generating as much of it as possible, rather than on concern for any product that 
had gone missing. Why would there be concern for an extra recycle to ensure the last 1% of 
product is removed from the bottom of the tank if a 15% efficiency gain can be found by 
simply moving more material through the process at a faster rate?  
However, it soon became clear that this material must be protected and safeguarded. 
To address these challenges, nuclear reprocessing facilities have followed one of two 
potential paths: weapon-state nuclear reprocessing facilities have mitigated losses as well as 
reasonably possible, but focused on physical security to prevent theft (there is little 
imperative for a weapons-state to steal its own plutonium), while the only non-weapons-state 
reprocessing facility, RRP, has been highly instrumented to take thousands of very expensive 
and time-consuming destructive analysis samples. One of the methods suggested to solve the 
problem of safeguarding material during reprocessing is to use the solution-monitoring 
system of the facility to provide not merely additional qualitative confidence but additional 
quantitative confidence to ensure that the materials have not been misplaced.  
This approach is designed to be prescriptive, for both domestic and international 
safeguards. Both types of safeguards have specific requirements that must be fulfilled; and 
the workhorse of this technique, accountancy, is the basis for all applied safeguards. The 
layering of process monitoring as a transparency or confidence-building mechanism does not 
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provide any quantitative benefit, discouraging its use as a safeguards tool. Other 
developmental technologies are similarly not able to contribute meaningfully to safeguards in 
a quantitative fashion.  
Furthermore, these prescriptive methods are seen as a layer of defense applied over an 
operating facility. Using an approach of defense in depth, multiple measurements are taken in 
tanks specially homogenized to provide good measurements. Additionally, this defense in 
depth in modern U.S. facilities will likely include international safeguards requirements as 
well as domestic safeguards requirements, significantly increasing safeguards burden through 
efficiency degredation. This paradigm works very well for small to medium sized facilities, 
but the efficiency degredation in large facilities creates an adversarial relationship between 
operator and safeguarding personnel.  
United States domestic safeguards are a combination of security and accountancy 
measurements. Accountancy, as a technical term, means the assay (isotopics and amount) of 
material to ensure that no material has gone missing. Domestic safeguards in the United 
States have undergone significant changes, often with exceptions for individual facilities. 
However, material is commonly graded into class based on its attractiveness. Attractiveness 
is determined by the quantity and quality of material in an individual facility. The 
requirements are rather arcane, representing multiple forms of material (e.g. uranium 
concentrations of 100g/kg representing class B materials, provided that uranium metal 
concentration is U-235) that are combined with quantity to provide a Category.3 ii In general, 
the requirements are as follows:  
 1) Probability of Nondetection < 3% at p<0.05 (95% confidence). 
                                                 
ii
 To further complicate matters, the protection requirements for reprocessing facilities (Category 1) are 
classified.. 
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 2) Material Unaccounted For < 2% of active material or a Category II material; in 
nitric acid or solution (such as in a reprocessing plant) this represent 2 kg Pu/U-233 or 6 kg 
U-235. 
 3) Materials are accounted for at least bi-monthly. 
These requirements are much more stringent than international safeguards. Consider 
an assumptive pilot-scale reprocessing facility that reprocesses 100 tons of heavy metal per 
year of irradiated nuclear fuel at discharge burnup. Under the assumption of 1% plutonium 
and no prior or expected holdup (generous), measurement error cannot exceed 1.2% of the 
plutonium at 95% confidence, driving the actual mean estimation to ~ 0.5% of the throughput 
of any solution bearing plutonium. This level of confidence is difficult to achieve in practice 
and is greatly complicated with materials stuck inside of the facility; holdup between book-
closures can be the primary driver of uncertainty.  
It is clear that U.S. reprocessing facilities will be safeguarded, but a campaign method 
relying exclusively on destructive analysis samples is not acceptable in a modern facility. 
This echoes the drastic over-design of first-generation nuclear reactors for safety. A clear 
parallel exists between the lack of neutronic-thermohydraulic coupling and overdesign in 
safety analysis to the lack of process-safeguards coupling and overdesign in reprocessing 
safeguards. The requirement to secure the materials is not in its infancy, but the drastic 
differential budget between a nuclear security programs and civilian nuclear reprocessing 
changes the requirements from an effectively infinite budget to one much more limited and 
requiring much greater efficiency from the safeguards system to make the closed nuclear fuel 
cycle more economically viable.  
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Historical Background 
While the idea of a safeguards envelope using the operational characteristics as a free 
variable appears to be novel, the topics of nuclear safeguards, safeguards by design, nuclear-
fuel-cycle optimization, process-monitoring methods, and reprocessing safety have extensive 
literature. For brevity, a limited selection of prior work in safety envelopes and solution 
monitoring analysis are presented.  
 
Prior Work in Safety Envelopes 
Operating facilities make use of safety envelopes, also commonly called operating 
envelopes. Safety envelopes are normally the boundaries around which normal operation can 
occur. Exceeding these boundaries leads to non-normal response: rapid temperature increase 
in a chemical reactor may lead to heat-steam rerouting to reduce reaction rates to prevent a 
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) or a power reduction in a nuclear 
power plant with a radiation area monitor alarm. These operating envelopes are a standard 
part of the operating environment for most facilities as simply a state of practice.  
 
Prior Work in Solution Monitoring / Process Monitoring Methods 
Research by Ehinger at Oak Ridge National Laboratory is the earliest known non-
simulated data published and analyzed. An Integrated Equipment Test (IET) facility was 
constructed as an example pilot-scale facility, running synthetic plutonium in depleted 
uranium.4 A mass-tracking system, integrating a pair of dip-tube measurements (providing 
level and density), was developed at this facility, to resolve events. Because of the (relative) 
simplicity of the facility, the research was able to design modules to handle each aspect of 
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the facility, but designed in an integrated manner. Most importantly, this facility was actually 
tested against diversion: at one point, guest researchers were provided the opportunity with a 
team of welders to alter the facility and remove material. The code developed by Ehinger was 
able to detect the removal of the material (though the false alarm rate was significant, often 
one or two false alarms per day).5 This rather severe false alarm rate and the requirement for 
a custom system for each small plant limits the application, but this early research was the 
foundation for the process monitoring systems at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, the 
prime example of this Dissertation (See Appendix 1). 
 Early approaches at Argonne National Laboratory in integrated system tracking 
(focused on nuclear power plants) were based on a code named PRODIAG. This technique 
used neural networks to train expert systems to identify off-normal conditions. 6 
Unfortunately, due to overtraining of the neural network systems, this technique was dropped 
in favor or IGENPRO. IGENPRO, developed at Argonne National Laboratory, is a technique 
and code used in order to resolve events using first principles thermohydraulic codes instead 
of event-based structure. This methodology is especially relevant because it is one of the first 
cases in which the abstracted event structures (prescripted) are replaced with higher fidelity 
of for online assessment. 7 As the methodology progressed, fuzzy logic was used to eliminate 
noise in the incoming signals, through their more advanced code, PROTREN. 8 
Tom Burr of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and John Howell of Glasgow 
University of the UK have an extensive library of research on process monitoring 
methodologies.9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 It is their intention to remove process monitoring methods 
from a qualitative "additional measure" or containment/surveillance (C/S) system to a 
quantitative-safeguards-relevant system. Burr and Howell primarily have focused on static 
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plutonium tank-to-tank transfers (solution monitoring), generalized to any tank-to-tank 
transfer. Their models take into account multiple uncertainty types, including data 
amalgamation errors. In brief, the Burr and Howell methodologies revolve around: 
1) Marking an event for start and stops, during or immediately after an event, from 
measurements of level, temperature, and density. 
2) Analyzing the cumulative residuals from the measured datapoints 
a)  This may take the form of linear tests or nonlinear regression tests.17 
b)  This may take the form of multivariate analysis, combining independent 
measurements to figures of merit (e.g. mass from density and volume.). 
Literature in Burr has considered fractal analysis, fuzzy logic, linear process 
fault detection and diagnosis, and nonlinear time series analysis.  
3) Classifying the event (e.g. transfer, boiling, evaporation, etc), to assist in resolving errors 
for less statistically focused inspectors.  
Burr has continued his research in testing multiple statistical tests against expected 
diversion sets. In this case, Burr and Howell tested for the lowest probability of nondetection 
(PND) under the conditions of a static false alarm rate (FAR), using the same developed 
tank-to-tank transfer simulator described previously. Croiser's cumulative sum residual 
method was established to be the superior test under his conditions.  
Finally, methodologies based on event marking and using time between events as the 
discriminator have been developed by Garcia. This method relies on sequential probability 
ratio tests (SPRTS) in which the time vector is one of the primary tested in a multivariate 
analysis of change from nominal conditions. The reason for this change is that the physical 
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models of process characteristics often lack the fidelity (especially real-time) to estimate the 
correct values.  
It is clear that in the current trend of research for solution monitoring, the physical 
models are not explicitly used, but serve only as a guide to support the data-driven analysis. 
While differing levels of fidelity exist (Burr and Howell's focus on the actual measurements, 
Garcia's time-series event marking), the actual process is ignored in favor of abstraction for 
safeguards.  
Broad scale analyses of the uncertainties in the measurements of safeguards as the 
material moves through a facility are rare. Work by Cipiti and Duran has generated a lab-
view model of a nuclear reprocessing facility (PUREX) with synthetic measurements 
interspersed in the facility. This research takes into account systematic and random error and 
includes a start-up and shut-down cycles, in order to accurately simulate actual uncertainties. 
This model is intended to be used as the framework for analyzing the impact of new 
technologies in reprocessing facilities: a factor of 100 in measurement certainty may not be 
actually valuable if that measurement certainty is only applicable on a stream with low SNM. 
A rudimentary security model, using different probabilities of detection based on the current 
perceived threat level by the facility (base level and alerted) shows that rapid detection of 
material removal by process monitoring safeguards equipment can actively benefit the 
detection and neutralization of security threats.   
 
Objectives 
The primary objective of this research is to develop an alternative, more operations-
friendly methodology of applying safeguards—one that will have higher confidence, lower 
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false alarms, and reduced safeguards burden—by changing operational parameters of the 
facility and including transparency measures as quantifiable data. This methodology is 
unique in operational integration and treating safeguards as a fundamental aspect of operating 
a facility, instead of a layered defense over an operating facility. Higher confidence will be 
established through leveraging more data in making decisions regarding the location of 
nuclear material, rather than treating these data as noise. Lower false alarm rates can be 
achieved by integrating these data as a second-check before an alarm is triggered. With lower 
alarm rates and higher confidence, facilities operating under safeguards envelopes will not 
require as many shutdown/flushes that decrease throughput, reducing the negative impact to 
operational efficiency from safeguards.  
The tasks that support this are 1) defining a common quantifiable metric between 
solution monitoring and material accountancy, 2) implementing a form of solution 
monitoring on an area of a facility, 3) changing operation to increase efficiency of the 
solution monitoring, and 4) demonstrating this change did not reduce efficiency of the plant 
as a whole.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE  
Introduction 
Rather than an independent analysis of solution monitoring and accountancy without 
considering alterations in the process, this Dissertation proposes the direct integration of the 
operation of the facility as a free variable to create an operating space known as the 
safeguards envelope. A safeguards envelope must explicitly address the safety, security 
(domestic safeguards), and international safeguards requirements, with the intention of 
optimizing the cost efficiency of the facility. This is shown as Figure 1. The region of 
viability is the area in which a facility can operate because operation outside of this envelope 
would be illegal from one or more regulatory standpoints. The efficiency distribution within 
the region of viability is never determined explicitly. Typically, the operations of the facility 
are fixed, limited by the boundaries of safety, safeguards, and security. In some advanced 
facilities, safety is directly integrated and operations can be changed or designed to be 
operated in such a way to increase safety, but operational changes intending to adjust for all 
three systems have not yet been proposed and demonstrated.   
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Figure 1.  Region of viability for operations in a nuclear facility. 
 
An increase in efficiency of reprocessing in the nuclear fuel cycle could bring 
reprocessing below the threshold needed to make this technology viable economically. It is 
unlikely that the safeguards burden alone increases the cost beyond the more economical 
once-through cycle.18 With a significant increase in the cost of uranium world-wide or a 
choice to pursue reprocessing as an energy-security (strategic) choice, reprocessing may be 
pursued. This work suggests a safeguards envelope operation to reduce the cost per kilogram 
in an example reprocessing facility and assumes that this reprocessing facility has already 
been constructed. The safeguards envelope method is intended to address the safeguards 
effects that are only found in nuclear facilities. Thus, generating a safeguards envelope is a 
nuclear fuel cycle specific problem.  
Any safeguards envelope is subject to several constraints:  
1) Operating facilities are prone to local changes and perturbations on a daily basis, so a 
safeguards envelope must cope with expected slight operational changes.  
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2) Operating facilities are prone to equipment failure, which should be explicitly 
addressed.  
3) Operating facilities are ultimately controlled by human beings, requiring human-
factors integration. Rather than treat this explicitly, the envelope methodology 
suggested must be clearly definable in a few variables, such as operating speed, valve 
conditions, or detection limits.  
4) The envelope must represent not only the ideal operating conditions, but conditions of 
the facility that the operator can move to for maintenance, changes, or special 
packages with clear requirements at these stages. 
5) The envelope must provide for an overarching uncertainty related to safeguards while 
addressing the more explicit requirements of safety and security, as well as a local 
requirement for the same. Specifically, a local material balance area may be out of a 
solution-monitoring-only envelope due to equipment failure, requiring expensive 
accountancy measurements, but this increase in uncertainty should be mitigated and 
integrated into the rest of the envelope.  
6) The envelope must be based on the common metric of probability of success at a 
certainty level for safety, security, and safeguards.  
Under these requirements, this work cannot provide the recommended changes to a 
given facility; each facility will be sufficiently unique that a common analysis is impossible. 
However, this methodology explains how to evaluate potential changes into a facility, and 
when such computational power is available, to establish the ideal operating conditions. The 
severe computational requirements required to establish the true ideal are outlined in the final 
chapter of this Dissertation.  
17 
 
 
 
 
Security in the Safeguards Envelope 
The requirements described above, especially for a common metric, work well with 
the frontrunner in security evaluation methods. There are multiple ways of evaluating 
security at nuclear facilities, but the forerunning methodology has been developed by M. L. 
Garcia, and the author directs readers to her publications for details.19 20 This methodology is 
quantitative, rather than qualitative, although there remains some additional uncertainty 
above what would be expected because the method cannot predict human behavior. Instead, 
it attempts to capture these elements into probabilities derived from historical simulation data 
of attacks against facilities. This method has been adopted and evolved by the DOE to form 
part of their standard assessment of nuclear facilities. This evaluation is semi-quantitative. 
Through the steps outlined below, a probability of detection, interception, and neutralization 
(made of several conditional probabilities) is generated from an average of these probabilities 
for a set of scenarios. The combined probability must meet a threshold determined by DOE.  
To make an evaluation of the physical security of a high value nuclear target 
(Category IV facilities, as expected for nuclear reprocessing facilities), several steps are 
taken:  
1) A model of barriers is developed between the a stationary target and a potential 
adversary at the fenceline or inside of the facility in the case of theft. 
a) Each barrier has an associated delay time and an associated detection 
probability.  
2) A simulation is run, effectively tallying each pathway through each set of barriers . 
Figure 2 shows this visually: the red pathway is an optimal pathway through a set of 
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concentric barriers, where thickness of the barrier represents time or difficulty 
associated with crossing the barrier.  
a) The associated delay for each of these barriers is tabulated, as well as at what 
point the adversary was detected. In this analysis, the detection probability is 
the only nondeterministic number.  
b) The probability of intercepting and neutralizing the threat must exceed a 
certain value. As in the example Figure 2, the most efficient (lowest barriers) 
path is the limiting case.  
3) A force on force exercise through computer using humans controlling avatars is used 
to establish the realism of these parameters for nontheft scenarios. 
4) Very limited live-action force on force exercises are performed at the site for nontheft 
scenarios. 
There are several implicit assumptions in this model, but two are most important in 
terms of application of the safeguards envelope: 
1) The target is stationary and the adversary knows exactly where the target is. 
2) The security system works independently of all other systems.  
The first assumption is highly conservative, and almost all changes to the system within the 
safeguards envelope should invalidate this assumption and add security resistance. 
Unfortunately, this will not be reflected in this methodology, and the author is not aware of 
widely accepted methodologies in which this is taken into consideration. If the second 
assumption is removed and the safeguards and security systems are integrated, the 
probability of detection for theft is expected to rise significantly.21 
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Figure 2. DOE-vulnerability analysis. 
 
This methodology does provide the limiting constraints on adjustments to the system 
and allows for the security bounding on the safeguards envelopes developed. Presuming that 
the security system is already at the threshold for unacceptable detection probabilities, the 
conditions of the safeguards envelope are as follows: 
1) Material movement is acceptable or even preferred, even though no credit can be 
taken for the movement. 
2) Material cannot remove security barriers or be moved through a layer of defense 
without additional security measures being moved into place.  
3) New operating parameters can only increase the probability of detection for theft (i.e. 
operating parameters that obscure C/S sensors are unacceptable or require additional 
security measures to be moved into place).  
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Safety in the Safeguards Envelope 
The technique used for evaluating safety probabilities in Safeguards Envelope 
Method is probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Though other methods have been used in 
safety analysis, the quantitative nature of PRA and ease of including changes makes it the 
preferred method. Developed partially in response to the Three Mile Island and high-profile 
NASA incidents, PRA uses failure-tree analysis to estimate the final probabilities of major 
target incidents. The most serious of these incidents is major release of nuclear material to 
the public. While PRA has seen significant use in the nuclear reactor industry, the 
introduction into reprocessing facilities is more likely to have come from the adoption of 
PRA by high-risk chemical industrials following the gas release at Bhopal, India.  
PRA analysis uses an adapted fault-tree analysis.22 It is adapted, rather than a pure 
fault-tree analysis because it allows for contingent-event requirements: multiple subsystems 
must fail, but not in order. This cross-linking of the multiple subsystems makes this a 
superior safety analysis tool compared to the design basis accident (DBA), which assumes a 
set of fault-tree pathways to major accidents (this updated methodology makes sense in light 
of the relatively minor cascading failures that led to Three Mile Island). An example PRA 
tree is shown in Figure 3, in which events (yellow) are binary statements that can be either 
true or false, and conclusions are listed on the right side with green representing acceptable 
operation and grey representing levels of damage to the facility.  
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Figure 3. Basic PRA methodology.  
 
The use of PRA in a nuclear reprocessing facility will revolve around a few major 
incidents:  
1) Major disruption to operations that is recoverable within a timeframe that is 
determined by risk tolerance at the facility. 
2) Major disruption to operations that is not recoverable within the above timeframe. 
3) Significant release of radiological material to the public (or chemical release inducing 
a health hazard).  
Unfortunately, without a complete, customized PRA for a nuclear reprocessing 
facility, estimating this probability is difficult at best. However, a replacement for PRA in the 
chemical industry exists when a full PRA is not available: expert elicitation. Expert 
elicitation was used as a substitution in this Dissertation. Presuming, as in the security case, 
that the safety system is already at the threshold for unacceptable detection probabilities, 
changes which affect the safety system will require additional safety measures. Examples of 
these changes are listed below:  
Initiating
Event Explanation Good
Damage Level 1
Damage Level 2
Damage Level 3
Damage Level 4
True
(yes)
False
(no)
Pivotal
Event 1
Pivotal
Event 2
Pivotal
Event 3
Pivotal
Event 3
Pivotal
Event 3
Pivotal
Event 2
Event phrased
as a statement
Damage Level 1
Good
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1) Material which is caustic should not remain in a vessel any longer than required. 
2) Pressures and temperatures should not be increased, as both of these lead to more 
failures of valves and tanks. 
3) Changes to the system should not increase residence time of radiological personnel 
for measurements inside of the hot cells.  
4) Maintenance, the primary cause of failures in chemical facilities, should not be 
affected. Note that some maintenance must be performed in radiological areas, 
compounding the issue with (3) above.  
 
International Safeguards in the Safeguards Envelope 
International safeguards in reprocessing facilities are discussed in the preceding 
chapter. The use of the probability metric is more difficult for combining subsystems 
together as the systems-analysis perspective on nuclear reprocessing facilities is limited. 
Historical reprocessing facilities have been optimized for throughput, without consideration 
of safeguards; in the case of Rokkasho, the process monitoring subsystem is regarded as a 
confidence-building measure and not part of a formal safeguards optimization. However, 
modern safeguards research has called for multiple subsystems to be combined to generate 
confidence. The following is an example of how to integrate two subsystems in safeguards 
system, process monitoring (PM) and accountancy.  
When supplementing accounting methods with PM measures, either of two systems 
may be applied. In the first model (union model), either alarm may warrant an investigation. 
Alternatively, monitors may choose to only investigate cases in which both alarms sound 
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(intersection model). Since both alarms must sound to warrant investigation under the 
intersection model, a very sensitive PM system is needed.  
Sensitivity and specificity are not intrinsic properties of a monitoring system; rather, 
the monitoring system only relates the two. For example, both A, the PND of accountancy 
and A, the FAR of accountancy depend on the material unaccounted for (MUF) alarm 
threshold. Thus for a given PM, it is possible to compute PM such that the overall system 
sensitivity and specificity remain the same. This represents a threshold for usefulness of a 
PM detection system: any system producing a higher FAR than the threshold will only 
interfere with plant operation, and any system with a higher PND poses an unacceptable risk. 
Using the requirements for international safeguards outlined below, the explicit curves for 
the probability requirements of the process monitoring system can be calculated to be useful.  
 
Single Sensor Case 
Assume the case of a single sensor, from which a set of readings can be taken. These 
readings may be either a composite of time-delayed readings or a single reading with a 
known uncertainty. The readings are expected to be along a Gaussian distribution. If there is 
a diversion of material (i.e., the true mean is moved), the shape of the curve should not 
change, but the mean will move. This is outlined below in Figure 4, where material 
unaccounted for (MUF) represents the diversion.  
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Figure 4. Comparison of the diversion and nondiversion scenarios. 
 
As can be seen, there is overlap between the distributions. In fact, no matter the 
distance in mean between the two distributions, there will always be more overlap. As the 
two means become closer (indicating protracted diversion, in our case), discrimination is 
more difficult. As they move farther apart, discrimination is less difficult. The zoomed in 
area from Figure 4 is the overlap, displayed in larger form in Figure 5. Consider two 
thresholds of detection, shown as the green line in panels a and b. The overall error is the 
integral of the blue and red areas, with the threshold affecting this total amount of error and 
the amount of each type of error. 
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Figure 5, a and b. Threshold impact on error. 
 
Assuming that false alarms and failure to detect are equally damaging, the optimal 
threshold is precisely at the intersection of the two distributions. This is clearly not the case 
in nuclear nonproliferation, in which mistakenly believing material has been removed is 
significantly less relevant than material’s being removed with the regulator unaware of the 
diversion. Regulatory limits set by the IAEA or DOE normally provide a minimum 
confidence in successful detection. For a single-sensor case with a single measurement set 
(i.e. strictly accountancy), this threshold is set.  
 
Two Sensor Case 
Multiple sensors, and their integration, make up an entire field of research. Methods 
such as Dempster-Shafer, fuzzy logic, "lean manufacturing," and others seek to make 
distinctions between normal or off-normal operations. In this section, a multi-sensor 
approach that is significantly constrained is presented.  
Consider the case of two sensors under the following constraints:  
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1) Sensors may only be combined in unions or intersections. This is to say that Sensor A 
OR Sensor B may trigger an alarm, or Sensor A AND Sensor B must both trigger to 
induce an alarm.  
2) Optimal thresholds can be determined independently for Sensor A and Sensor B for 
any configuration. This can be accomplished by Monte Carlo analysis. 
3) Sensors are strictly independent. 
Because the thresholds of Sensor A and Sensor B are known, the FAR (Type I error, 
denoted as ) and PND (Type II error, denoted as ) can be calculated for each sensor. This 
can be seen graphically above in Figure 5, a and b.  
The union of Sensor A and Sensor B allows for the calcuation of the overall  and . 
Graphically, this is represented by Figure 6. In Figure 6, two sensor detection spaces are 
overlaid, with the integral of all filled in area the total detection probability, and white space 
in the domain is area of nondetection.  
 
 
Figure 6. Union of two sensor probabilities. 
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Equation 1 shows the false alarm rate of the overall system. The area that would 
appear to overlap between the two probability densities (the area that Sensor 1 cuts into 
Sensor 2) is subtracted because it would be counted twice (i.e. AB is counted in both A and 
B) 
       (1) 
The union of the sensors, both sensors must fail to register a change when there was a 
change for there to be a failure of detection. Thus, the sensors are effectively serial 
(intersection) for the probability of nondetection, as shown in Equation 2, below.  
   (2) 
As expected, in the case where Sensor B is nonexistent, the system is    and 
  	 implying 
   and 
  .  
If, instead, both Sensor A and Sensor B must alarm in order to detect, the figures are 
reversed, in that both sensors must fail when there is no diversion to cause a false alarm, but 
either sensor can fail to detect when there is a diversion for the system to fail to detect. These 
are shown in equations 3 and 4.  
    (3) 
       (4) 
 
Multi-Sensor Case 
Multiple sensors can be combined in sets of unions or intersections. Three cases will 
be presented and then the method will be generalized.  
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Consider the case that Sensor A AND Sensor B alarming will induce an alarm, but 
Sensor C alone can also induce a full system alarm. This is an Intersection-Union. A false 
alarm can be induced by either a failure in Sensor A and Sensor B, or a single point failure in 
Sensor C, shown in Equation 5. A failure to detect a change requires either Sensor A or 
Sensor B to fail and Sensor C to fail, shown in Equation 6.  
       (5) 
       (6) 
This case may be representative of a real life case in which both the gross-neutron 
and gamma sensors must both alarm to induce a system-wide alarm or a neutron-
spectroscropy technique focused on plutonium-specific spectra can trigger an alarm.  
Consider the case that Sensor A or Sensor B or Sensor C can trigger a system-wide 
alarm. This is a Union-Union. A false alarm can be triggered by failure in any given sensor. 
However, a failure to detect a change requires all three sensors to fail. These conditions are 
represented below as equations 7 and 8.  
                (7) 
   (8) 
            This case may be represented of a real life case of highly enriched uranium, where 
reliable passive detection techniques are difficult, and as a result multiple layers of defense 
are required to secure the material.  
Finally, consider the case that Sensor A, Sensor B, and Sensor C must each trigger a 
local alarm to induce a system alarm. This is an Intersection-Intersection. A false alarm is 
rare, requiring each sensor to independently fail. However, any sensor can fail to alarm 
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locally for the system to fail to detect a change. These conditions are represented below as 
equations 9 and 10.  
   (9) 
               (10) 
             It becomes evident that each addition of a sensor increases the complexity of the 
analysis significantly. Furthermore, the third constraint, requiring strict independence of 
measurements, becomes increasingly difficult to verify. In the Intersection-Union example 
above, the covariance between the gross-neutron sensor and the neutron-spectroscopy 
method is clearly not zero. A neutron-spectroscopy method will clearly not alarm if there are 
no neutrons that are detectable by a gross-neutron sensor.  
The systems above can be generalized, however, relieving the pressure of the third 
constraint and also reducing the complexity of the equations. In the two sensor case, Sensor 
A and Sensor B were reduced to the overall system. If the combination of these two sensors 
is simply regarded as yet another subsystem (e.g. Sensor AB), the Union-Intersection, Union-
Union, and Intersection-Intersection models of Sensors A, B, and C become Union and 
Intersection of Sensors AB and C. In this framework, the explicit requirements for 
independence (constraint #3) is only required between Sensor AB and Sensor C. The terms 
AB and AB are implicitly defined by the reliability of Sensor AB.iii  
The Intersection-Union model presented above is demonstrated in terms a Union of 
Sensors AB and Sensor C. In the example below, constraint #3 is still assumed.  
                   (11) 
                                                 
iii
 Reminder:  only equals if A and B are independent. Similarly for . 
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                              (12) 
             These are the same results as above. Union-Union and Intersection-Intersection are 
similar. In this way, any set of N sensors that are to be combined, subject to the constraints 
described above, can be combined into a single sensor.  
 
Effective Uncertainty as a Figure of Merit  
Understanding the false alarm rates and failures to detect are less valuable than 
understanding the effective uncertainty. The requirements for a shorter material balance 
period are based on the fact that at a certain level of uncertainty, there is no longer sufficient 
confidence that material has not been removed. 
 is the current effective measurement 
uncertainty of the system. In this framework, it is much preferred to provide the new 
effective measurement uncertainty of the system as a metric for a new material balance 
period.  
Returning to the prior Figure 1 in this section, the  and  could be calculated if the 
optimal threshold was known, the diversion was known, and the curves were known. If 
instead of a threshold, a set of measurements were known then the  and  could be 
calculated using a standard Z-test, using the threshold as the power of the test. This is shown 
in equation 13, where the power P, is the  of this particular set.  
   
  (13) 
      Assuming a minumum detection threshold at 1- (i.e. able to draw a conclusion in 
classical statistics), the inverse normal function (quantile) can be applied, resulting in 
equation 14. 
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	    

  (14) 
            Similarly, we may invert , which is originally calculated at power P as equation 15 
and then inverted in equation 16 
      (15) 
  

 (16) 
The subtraction in the standard Z test is normalized over significant quantities in this 
case. The precision of the diversion against which we are testing allows for this inversion. 
Note that in all cases as can be seen in Figure 5, a and b; the only change between  and  is 
the reality of removal of material.  
By subtracting these two equations, the random sampling can be removed, as shown 
in equation 17. 
	     !   (17) 
           Thus, an effective measurement uncertainty can be described. This result is valid 
under all conditions except for the constraints above as a figure of merit, but only accurately 
models reality under the conditions that measurements are Gaussian or where the number of 
sensors is very large (i.e., the collective uncertainty will approach Gaussian by the central 
limit theorem).  
The analysis of this Dissertation has used accountancy as the base sigma. In this case, 
A0 is estimated as or .21125 of an SQ (1.69 kilograms), assuming exactly 5%  and 0.1% 
 (single-sided test).  
The final equation for the probability requirements is given as equation 18, below: 
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"	  #$!  #$!  	    	   (18) 
where  
#$!  #$    #$ 
#$!  #$ 
 is the inversion of the Normal Gaussian distribution, given below as  
equation 19.  
%  &'	'%  	 (19) 
% ( )	 (20) 
	
  * +,-.! &/- % -.!.0
  (21) 
1.  * +2+,34325!-5!  6	)	) 78 ) -79
 ) : ;.50
  (22) 
1
  	 (23) 
In the above equations, α is the probability of a false alarm (Type I error), β is the 
probability of a failure to detect (Type II error), and the subscripts refer to the systems. The 
PM subscript denotes the process monitoring system, the A subscript designates the 
accountancy system, and the PM+A subscript designates the combined system (note that 
these do not combine linearly). The Ck are simply analytic constants in the erf function, 
which is strictly a mathematical construct to invert the normal Gaussian distribution. These 
curves are shown as Figure 7, where the blue line is the threshold at which the process 
monitoring system reduces the effective uncertainty in the measurement (and is therefore 
useful as a safeguards technique). 
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Figure 7, a and b. Threshold of usefulness for PM in a) union and b) intersection 
analysis.  
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Integration of the Limits for Safety, Security, and Safeguards with a Common Metric of 
Efficiency 
The integration of safety, security, and safeguards in the methodology is simple to 
explain in theory, but much more difficult to execute in practice. How should efficiency be 
calculated? Profit margin appears to be the first choice, but little data exists for analysis. 
Instead, the effective operating throughput of the facility is recommended: this can be much 
more easily calculated from the operational parameters. In most cases the exact operating 
data may not be available, but because of the unique flush-out requirements, extension of a 
facility's material balance period (MBP) is a reasonable substitute. This is because the flush 
out is strictly a safeguards requirement that reduces the operating time of the facility.  
Additionally, for any safeguards subsystem, (process monitoring is used here as an 
example), the increase in material balance period can be estimated. Using a baseline of an 
assumed MBP of eight days, the prior 2D graphs can be rendered into 3D in Figure 8 and 
Figure 9. In this case Equations 18 above no longer equal, but instead the new effective 
material balance period can be determined as by Equations 24, 25, and 26, below, where 
MBP0 is assumed to be eight and is the base material balance period that exists currently at a 
facility. 
	

<=>?< (24) 
#$!  @	  #$!  #$!A (25) 
  @	    A (26) 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the results, using the assumption of an eight-day MBP.  
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Figure 8. Maximum allowable MBP for given PM characteristics in the Union Model.  
 
 
            
Figure 9. Maximum allowable MBP for PM characteristics in the Intersection Model.  
 
The allowable MBP grows without bound as PM approaches 0.01% for the Union 
model or  approaches 5% for the Intersection model. Of course, if one can reach an 
acceptable level of confidence strictly by PM at cost lower than accountancy, the accounting 
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system becomes unnecessary. This shows the relationship between any two subsystems. 
Provided there are no conditional statements, a Boolean combination of any set of 
subsystems can be achieved.  
These calculations have assumed that the solution monitoring system does not break 
any of the conditions set for safety and security. Unfortunately, because of the static and 
conservative nature of the security assumptions, no official gain can be made in that arena 
even though there is additional confidence. From a security perspective, this must be 
evaluated by expert elicitation. However, under the condition that the MBP would exceed the 
maintenance cycle, the safety system would become the limiting factor. In order to evaluate 
final effectiveness, a relationship between the final risks and the operational parameters in 
the PRA for the facility must be created. Provided this is available, the system can be 
optimized using the operational parameters as free variables.  
Note that the value of solution monitoring was monotonically increasing. If the safety 
analysis also is monotonic (e.g. the solution monitoring system induces an additional 
degradation factor), this optimization can be found using relatively simple nonlinear 
optimization techniques that are not as computationally expensive as an unknown space.  
37 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE EXAMPLE: THE IDAHO CHEMICAL 
PROCESSING PLANT 
Description of the ICPP 
Completed in 1953, the ICPP was designed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
(ORNL) personnel to process several types of fuel: aluminum clad fuel from the Material 
Test Reactor, unclad Experimental Breeder Reactor I (EBR-I) fuel, and Hanford neutron-
producing fuel. The amount and type of fuels processed at the ICPP expanded throughout its 
operational history. During forty years of operation, the facility reprocessed fuel from nearly 
100 tests and research facilities around the world and ultimately recovered approximately 32 
metric tons of uranium.  
The ICPP was equipped with several head-end dissolution processes capable of 
dissolving the aluminum-, zirconium-, stainless steel-, and custom-clad fuels.  The main 
extraction process separated uranium through a tributyl phosphate (TBP) extraction cycle 
followed by two methyl isobutyl ketone (MIBK) extraction cycles. History of the facility, 
description of the data recovery for this facility, and the available data are provided in 
Appendix 1. 
The Safeguards Envelope to be created will focus on a small subsection of the 
facility, the head-end process immediately before the accountancy tank. This area was chosen 
because data are available, the tanks in this area receive from multiple other tanks, and the 
area represents a major safeguards challenge. Figure 10 shows the flow sheet of the ICPP 
area that is the focus.  
 
  
 
Figure 10. Head-end of the ICPP.
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Figure 11. Event #1 is the event that diversions will be tested against. 
 
This event is most relevant because a solution monitoring system does not have the 
opportunity to acquire enough data to draw conclusions reliably. While this event represents 
roughly ~2% of operating time, the other events primarily are the hold-modes described in 
Burr's and Garcia's work and this problem has been effectively solved for safeguards 
systems. Figure 12 shows the data from operations. 
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Figure 12. Data for the tank flush. 
 
Despite an increase in fidelity by moving to higher order tests as described in the 
prior work, the effective decrease in measurement uncertainty is fundamentally limited. This 
presents a prime opportunity to apply a safeguards envelope, altering the operational 
parameters in order to increase the overall efficiency.  
 
Process Monitoring Added Without a Safeguards Envelope to Event #1 
The most basic form of solution monitoring comes from the application of static 
change-detection tests. Details of the underlying probabilities of these tests and multisensor 
integration is provided in the prior chapter. Static change-detection tests, such as a Z-test or 
students-t test, determine if the expected mean of two sets of data differ significantly at a 
level of confidence (in this case, the confidence is user-defined). At zero confidence, it can 
be established all things are the same, at infinite confidence, no two sets of data can be 
established to have the same mean (unless the sample represents the entire population). As 
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discussed in the prior chapter, the confidence that no material has been removed is 99%, or 
p=0.01, while maintaining that false alarms occur no more than 5% of the time.  
A data set containing the actual measurements, taking precisely the same amount of 
time, should have exactly the same mean, but this technique is even more sensitive to the 
exact start and stop times of the events. Also, the true mean is difficult to know, even from a 
historical data set. The estimated mean between the subtraction of the measured value and 
the "true" (historical) value should have a mean about zero explicitly, however. This allows 
for a normalized test against the mean, which is much easier in practice. A strict test of the 
differential between a historical and measured set would violate the requirements for the 
strict independence of the tests, so the cumulative residual will be tested instead. This has 
been established to be the most reliable solution monitoring test. 
Simulating diversions in the sample is done by reducing the data values of the 
historical set by a user-defined amount. The amount to be detected in this example is 0.5% 
removed from the tank over the course of the transient, below the limits for international and 
domestic safeguards at the ICPP, but likely representative of very large reprocessing facilities 
like RRP.  
Three data sets are created and then tested against each other using a combination of 
Z tests, students-t tests, Croiser’s cumulative sum tests, and Chi-square tests. The first data 
set is a hypothetical “historical” set of data for the event. The second data set is an example 
normal operation set of data, in which no material has been removed. The third data set is a 
diversion set in which material was removed, peaking at a cumulative 0.5% of the tank 
removed over the course of the transient in Event #1. Random noise is added to these data, 
based on the estimated measurement uncertainty expected by the IAEA (0.2%)23.  Systematic 
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noise has not been added. In a near-continuous operation, systematic noise should be 
representative of a drift in the data that can be modeled and adjusted. These systems should 
be recalibrated with each flush out in existing facilities. Assuming a calibration during the 
flush out at the end of the material balance period (assumed eight days in the base case), the 
author chooses to assume that the drift of the components over the course of less than thirty 
days is insignificant. Furthermore, in existing facilities, there are cross-checks from multiple 
pressure sensors to identify significant calibration drift over the short term.24 There are also 
recalibration/verification techniques that have been developed for online use that can be 
completed within a day.25 26 The noise added is shown as Figure 13, a standard Guassian. 
 
 
Figure 13. Probability density of measurement error (for the tank level). 
 
Furthermore, as a way of taking advantage of the fact that it is known the historically 
normal operation should follow a smooth curve, kernel regression is used to smooth the 
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historical set. This reduces the random error in the historical set and allows for the use of a Z 
test instead of a students-t test.  
A test of the normal data set to the historical data set provides a control case: 
mistaking normal operation for a diversion case represents a false alarm. A test of the 
diversion data set to the historical data set provides the test case: mistaking a diversion 
operation for a normal operation case represents a failure to detect. A summation of the false 
alarms over the total number of normal operation cases yields the false alarm rate. A 
summation of the failures to detect over the total number of diversion cases yields the 
probability of nondetection. This is shown below in Figure 14.  
 
 
Figure 14. The pathway for analysis for basic process monitoring. 
 
Kernal Regression  
To reduce the uncertainty in the historical set, kernel regression was used to create a 
best-fit function to the data received from ICPP. Kernel regression is a state estimation 
technique which is considered a nonparametric technique, for unlike linear regression, it does 
not assume a fundamental distribution in the data27. At each observed data point, a Kernel, or 
weighted function, is centered, and the Kernel assigns a weight to each position based on its 
proximity to each data point. With a given data set, a kernel (or weight function) is centered 
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at each data point and at each point is used to evaluate the weight of its neighbors for local 
fitting (see Figure 15). 
 
 
Figure 15 a and b. Plot of a) measurement points which have no linear relationship 
and b) associated Gaussian weight functions for their respective data points. 
 
In reality, there exist many different kernel functions (e.g. square, quartic, cosine), but 
the Gaussian remains the most popular.  The Gaussian kernel function is as follows: 
 
where X represents the x-value of the measurement point, x represents the x-value of the 
interpolated point, and a represents the kernel bandwidth. More will be explained about the 
kernel bandwidth later, but for now assume it to be any value. 
 
(a) 
(b) 
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Once applying the weight functions at each desired point, the interpolated y-value can 
be computed using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator: 
 
where i represents the ith measured point, j the jth interpolated point, Yi  the ith measurement, 
and yj the jth weight, interpolated value. As the kernel bandwidth has yet to be chosen, here 
are the results for Figure 16, a, b, and c.  data at various bandwidth values. 
 
 
 
Figure 16, a, b, and c. Kernel smoothing at various kernel bandwidths.   
 
As can be seen from Figure 16, a, b, and c. , various kernel bandwidths give 
drastically different results. The kernel bandwidth is a user-set parameter that essentially 
controls the width of the weight function (or rather the “broadening”). Too low a kernel 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
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bandwidth results in each measurement point carrying all the weight, resulting in just step 
interpolation such as in Figure 16, a, b, and c. Too high of a value will “overfit” the data by 
giving every point nearly equal weight and will approach fitting a single line (linear best fit) 
to the entire data set. In order to find the best value of the kernel bandwidth, optimization is 
necessary. This usually requires some outside knowledge that can hint at which value is 
“right.” 
The algorithm compares historical and trial data sets and tests the ability to detect a 
diversion by looking at two items: degree of residual randomness and deviation from the 
mean. To determine the effectiveness of the statistical tests, Markov Monte Carlo simulation 
of 500,000+ trials as a simple method for finding out the resultant FAR and PND values. 
In reality, data always has noise, and as are result, detecting small diversions is often 
difficult. To an approximation, we can assume that all measurements take the following 
form: 
BC  B  D  D (28) 
where D
 is the calibration error and D is the measurement error. Calibration 
error is due to the non-perfect tuning of the measurement device and is usually a static 
additive error. The error, however, is randomly distributed from one device to another. The 
more familiar measurement error is that which arises from small fluctuations within the 
control volume (e.g., miniscule temperature fluctuations or small movement) and is known to 
be normally distributed. As equation 28 shows, both errors mask the true value and can 
hamper any verification process. Indeed, both can also be averaged, assuming enough data 
exist to do so. Unfortunately, this is not the case in most scenarios, including that of our ICPP 
data. This is the realm in which statistical tests find their application as they look to the 
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overall data trends to discover any abnormalities. Before tests are created, diversion behavior 
must first be understood. 
Material diversions affect two components of measurement data: residual randomness 
and deviation from the mean or “expected” value.  A residual is defined as the difference 
between the measured value and the true value where ytrue(t) would be an exact analytical 
value. 
BC  BC  BC  D
  D (29) 
As equation 29 shows, a measurement residual should be nothing more than a time 
series of errors with a random distribution and mean of zero. In a diversion case, however, 
the residual would take on an entirely different behavior. First, it is important to understand 
that abnormal data can be seen as normal data with an added deviation where diverted(t) is 
the nuclear quantity taken as a function of time as shown in equation 30, below. 
BC  B  D
  D  C (30) 
If the residual of this curve was computed with respect to the true values of a normal 
curve, illustrated in equation 31, below, then it becomes obvious that the residual of an 
abnormal data curve is just a normal residual, such as equation 29, but with an added non-
random and/or non-zero mean function. 
BC  B  D
  D  C (31) 
In other words, to determine whether or not a tank has been tapped, one simply needs to look 
at the residual of its data; if the residual has neither a purely random distribution nor a zero 
mean, then assume that a diversion has taken place (see the following section).  
Unfortunately, detection with the above methodology is difficult for two reasons: not 
knowing ytrue(t), and having sparse data. Computing the most accurate residuals requires 
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knowing beforehand what ytrue(t) is, which is technically impossible. In fact, knowing it 
would imply perfect measurements, which would make this entire statistical process 
unnecessary. However, what is known is the historical data, which tell what the measurement 
“ought” to be. With that, it becomes feasible to make good approximations of ytrue(t), 
especially with good fitting techniques. One must take caution, for approximations can be too 
uncertain if the base data are too sparse. Even the tests themselves can be misleading if not 
enough information is present. Again, advanced statistics become useful. Numerous 
techniques have evolved which take advantage of sparse data and create reliable models to 
work with (e.g., Principle Component Analysis, Least-Squares Fit). With both reliable 
historical data and advanced statistics, it becomes very possible to distinguish abnormal 
behavior from normal operating conditions. 
Once the three simulated curves were created, Kernel regression was performed on 
the historical set to later approximate residuals. Kernel regression is a powerful state-
estimation technique designed to fit an approximate curve to noisy data. Unlike most familiar 
regression techniques, Kernel regression is non-parametric and does not actually make any 
initial assumptions about the shape of the curve. Instead, it applies a Gaussian weight 
function centered at each data point and gives each neighboring point a contribution that is 
proportional to their distance. This is seen in Figure 17, a kernel regression applied to some 
of the ICPP data, where the blue dashed line is the new estimated historical true values and 
the green were the raw data.  
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Figure 17. Kernel smoothing on simulated historical data.  
 
The degree of fitting is also a user-set parameter, called the Kernel bandwidth.  Too 
low a value connects the dots poorly, while one too high will “overfit” and produce large 
errors. This is one of the parameters that can be optimized in the algorithm for best 
performance. 
Once the Kernel-smoothed historical curve is obtained, the difference between that 
curve and the two trial curves (normal and diversion curve) give each trial curve its 
respective residual approximations. This is done by simply subtracting the raw data from the 
Kernel-smoothed curve for both the historical and trial case, as shown in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Diagram showing residual analysis with historical data and diversion data. 
 
Z and Students-t Tests 
Z tests and students-t tests are similar static mean differentiation tests. These tests are 
designed to identify whether the mean of two sets of data are different (i.e., determine the 
conclusion of differentiation between two sets at a threshold of evidence. These tests are very 
commonly used in statistical analysis because they are the most powerful tests for 
statistically normal data. Besides the assumption of normality, a Z test assumes a known 
variance and true mean for the population, while the student-t test does not. The students-t 
test will reduce to a Z test under large sample sizes (as the variance of the sample limits to 
the variance of the tested population. The Z test and students-t test are shown below as 
equations 32 and 33.  
E  FGHI   F   &JK  (32) 
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CL4LM-  NO -P4  O -PM OP4PM  NO 'Q  O 'Q-  RS
-L  S
--L  (33) 
In these equations, T is the mean of the sample, U is the true mean of the population against 
which the sample is being tested, F) is the estimated variance of the limited sample, 
calculated from the true variance () and the number of samples (n). Y is the mean of two 
independent samples, with S the combined normalized variance of the two independent 
samples. t and Z are both the test statistics which are inserted into the normal Gaussian 
equation to determine the power at which a conclusion can be drawn. The Z test statistics are 
provided into the integration of the normal Gaussian. The normal Gaussian is shown as 
equation 34, followed by its integration as equation 35.  
VWX U)   &-/   GM-M   (34) 
"Y  Z VW[W\  (35) 
           This integration provides the p value. While it is commonly referred to as a probability 
value, the p value represents a likelihood based on the current level of evidence. There are 
two ways of using a Z or students-t test: “one-tailed” and “two-tailed.” A one-tailed test only 
tests one side of the bell curve: the analyst must choose to test for above average or below 
average. A two-tailed test will provide information regarding both significantly above and 
significantly below, but has a higher threshold of evidence. This is seen most easily in  
Figure 19; it is clear that if the same evidence threshold for the one-tailed test was 
used for the two-tailed test (i.e. the highlighted areas under the curve) then the “tails” would 
be thinner for the two-tailed test. 
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Figure 19. Comparison of one and two sided tests. 
 
In application the p values for practically every value of Z have been calculated, and 
more often than not the Z value for a given test is simply compared to the Z value at a given 
threshold of likelihood at that level of evidence (data).  
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The student t statistic works very similarly, with the distinction that the “tails” are 
wider because the variance is not known. The test is effectively inferring the true variance as 
part of the test, which is why it has degrees of freedom in measurement of comparison to the 
two samples. As the likelihoods have been evaluated for each t value, the students-t test 
statistic is typically directly compared rather than integrating the function.  
 
Chi-Square Test 
A Chi-Square test has been used to replace the original Z testing of the cumulative 
sums to identify if the deviation from the “true” values has the appropriate variance. An 
unusually high variance could represent diversion, mechanical fatigue, or sensor failure. 
While the typical Chi-Square test is used to evaluate the performance of a system, the 
application of this test to the residuals can provide a second measure to determine if the 
residuals are away from normal.  
Equation 1 shows a standard Chi-Square test. In this equation, x2 is our test statistic, 
Oi is the individual observations (residuals), and Ei are the expected values.  
W-  * ]^_`_M`_ abc  (36) 
The numerator term is a sum of the residuals, and the denominator term becomes the 
variance of the historical set. As with a student’s-t test, very little is assumed about the data 
that is available and, as a result, the Chi-Square test has differing thresholds for evidence 
based on the number of degrees of freedom. The degrees of freedom are one less than the 
number of observations in the set. This test becomes more powerful faster with more data 
than other test types because the data are being used two ways (note: this also means outliers 
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can more easily impact the result). Seeking additional data in limited areas is promising in 
utilizing this test and therefore lower false alarms for the same probability of nondetection. 
This test has been integrated with the student’s-t as part of the standard suite for 
detecting diversions. Specifically, this test provides a mechanism for combining all residuals 
positively to address the diversion scenario of removal of material during a statistically high 
event.iv  
The issue that arises from adding a Chi-Square test is the increased FAR that is to be 
expected from adding additional tests. As discussed previously, a union or intersection model 
can be created with the Chi-Square and cumulative sum test. Some diversion types would not 
typically be detected with the cumulative sum test, and so only a union model can be applied. 
This has an unfortunate disadvantage: the FAR must increase with the linearly with the FAR 
for each test, but the detection probability for some diversions is only derived from one test.  
 
Croisier’s CUSUM 
Croisier’s CUSUM is a cumulative sum method which updates the prior sum before 
moving to the next iteration. The update to the prior sum determines if the new sum will be 
moved towards zero (as given in Eqs. 2-7), or if the system will be reset to zero. This 
resetting to zero is expected to increase the PND but decrease the FAR and so may be 
preferred in applications where many measurements are taken in multiple locations. The 
reduction to FAR, which increases linearly to the number of measurements in the union 
model, is a crucial requirement for MBP and acceptance by operators.  
de  fOe  gehiOe  gej -k  (37) 
                                                 
iv
 This diversion is outlined in a later section. 
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Oe  Oe  ge  l (38) 
Oe   (39) 
l  Oe  ge mn (40) 
Oe  Oe  ge mn  (41) 
Qe  OoCiOe  -k  (42) 
In equations 37-42, Ct is the existing and updating cumulative sum, St-1 is the prior sum, the 
new St is the new sum added onto this group, k is a scalar (in the direction of S for the 
multivariate case), p is a scaling parameter, and Yt is the new test statistic.  
The procedure for this analysis is very similar to other cumulative sum tests. The 
updated cumulative sum is used as a test statistic to determine if the root mean error is 
beyond a certain threshold with a given probability. Unique to this test is the parameter p. p 
is a scaling parameter for the impact of the most recent sum. In a students-t test, this factor is 
zero. However, if this parameter is nonzero, p reduces the FAR, but increases the PND 
because it adds an additional threshold for divergence on a given measurement before it is 
added to the cumulative sum, as expected by a system which has thousands of measurements.  
One of the issues associated with Croisier’s cumulative sum is that a control 
parameter, p, is required as well as the standard threshold. As with the Chi-Square test, this 
test has the potential to increase the optimization, but also synthetically increases the 
parameter space. In the event that Croiser’s CUSUM’s p variable is highly sensitive, this test 
must be discarded.  
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Procedure Used 
A Markov Monte Carlo chain was created for each set. In each trial, the errors were 
added randomly, as above, and then the historical set was smoothed by the use of Kernel 
regression. The cumulative residuals were used as the basis for testing, as their mean should 
be zero and this has historical success. 500,000 runs were used to evaluate the probabilities, 
but 100,000 runs were repeated as part of code-checking. As each data point was added, a 
cumulative residual test was used to determine if the event (at that point) had exceeded the 
threshold. This type of test does not require the exact stop time of the transient and was used 
as a Z or student-t test. Using the assumption that the exact stop time was used, a second final 
cumulative sum test was used with a students-t test. The thresholds for these tests were 
altered incrementally, to determine the optimal thresholds.  
A multivariate test was also used, combining the density and level measurements to 
generate an effective volume. This test exceeded expectations of sufficient magnitude to 
require a second analysis. The FAR and PND were both significantly lower than 0.1%, 
allowing for several months MBP. This error took significant time to track down because the 
code associated with these tests had not been changed before running the analysis. It was 
believed that a heretofore unknown error within the code had produced a major bug in the 
reporting statistics.  
Several techniques for debugging were applied, as well as external review by 
colleagues not associated with this research. Finally as the code was determined to be 
accurate, and the new test variables—a combination of level, density, and temperature—were 
checked to ensure no major data flaws.  
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An analysis for skewness on the density and level measurements provided no 
valuable results, even at the p=0.01 level. While, at a glance, the data are correct, a very 
careful examination shows that the density measurements begin later and end sooner than the 
level measurements. As a result, the error (which is most significant at the beginning and 
ending of the transient) was drastically misestimated, suggesting that process monitoring 
could perform much better than would be achievable in actual operations. This overlap is 
demonstrated in Figure 20.  
 
 
Figure 20. Level and density discrepancy. 
 
The reason for the drastic increase in material balance period with the safeguards 
envelope operation was because of the synthetic increase in the number of points created 
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within the area in which the error was driven to zero. This compounded the underestimation 
of the FAR and PND and led to the drastic overestimation of the MBP.  
Several variables were still tested. Multiple case numbers were run to establish the 
uncertainty in the final results through the code. A test including level, density, and 
temperature with Kernel regression is the first test; density and temperature are not expected 
to contribute significantly to detection, but may contribute to false alarm rate. A second test, 
focusing only on level, is next, followed by a final test in which the Chi-square test is not 
applied for comparison. 
 
Results of the Basic Process Monitoring  
The results of the example basic process monitoring are below as Table 1 for three 
diversion percentages.  
Table 1. Results of the example monitoring. 
 
Diversion of 0.5% vs Error of 0.1%    
     
Cases  
FAR -
Base 
PND -
Base 
MBP -
Base 
10000 AllVariables  0.00% 0.99% 12.96 
 Level 0.01% 0.13% >30 
 Level (No Chi2) 0.00% 0.19% 23.99 
100000 AllVariables  0.00% 0.91% 13.19 
 Level 0.30% 0.13% >30 
 Level (No Chi2) 0.05% 0.15% >30 
100000 AllVariables  0.00% 0.89% 13.24 
 Level 0.00% 0.14% >30 
 Level (No Chi2) 0.01% 0.13% >30 
100000 AllVariables  0.00% 0.92% 13.21 
 Level 0.01% 0.14% >30 
 Level (No Chi2) 0.30% 0.15% >30 
500000 AllVariables  0.00% 0.89% 13.24 
 Level 0.00% 0.16% 28.74 
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Table 1 Continued 
 
Level (No Chi2) 0.00% 0.15% >30 
 Diversion of 0.5% vs Error of 0.2%    
     
Cases  
FAR -
Base 
PND -
Base 
MBP -
Base 
10000 AllVariables  1.52% 10.23% 9.14 
 Level 3.49% 5.54% 8.91 
 Level (No Chi2) 3.58% 6.31% 8.76 
100000 AllVariables  1.44% 10.36% 9.16 
 Level 3.45% 6.17% 8.85 
 Level (No Chi2) 3.93% 6.06% 8.89 
100000 AllVariables  1.46% 10.28% 9.16 
 Level 3.49% 6.24% 8.81 
 Level (No Chi2) 3.51% 6.13% 8.82 
100000 AllVariables  1.50% 10.35% 9.14 
 Level 3.49% 6.24% 8.81 
 Level (No Chi2) 3.40% 6.08% 8.88 
500000 AllVariables  1.48% 10.30% 9.15 
 Level 3.40% 6.14% 8.88 
 Level (No Chi2) 3.48% 6.16% 8.83 
 
 Diversion of 0.5% vs Error of 0.3%    
     
Cases  
FAR -
Base 
PND -
Base 
MBP -
Base 
10000 AllVariables  11.09% 19.21% 8.00 
 Level 16.40% 14.56% 8.00 
 Level (No Chi2) 16.30% 14.65% 8.00 
100000 AllVariables  10.85% 19.11% 8.00 
 Level 10.16% 14.56% 8.00 
 Level (No Chi2) 16.28% 14.33% 8.00 
100000 AllVariables  10.78% 19.45% 8.00 
 Level 16.37% 14.55% 8.00 
 Level (No Chi2) 16.54% 14.59% 8.00 
100000 AllVariables  10.88% 19.11% 8.00 
 Level 16.32% 14.58% 8.00 
 Level (No Chi2) 16.57% 14.57% 8.00 
500000 AllVariables  10.91% 19.25% 8.00 
 Level 16.42% 14.54% 8.00 
 Level (No Chi2) 16.27% 14.53% 8.00 
 
The results for basic process monitoring suggest that highly accurate online 
measurements (similar on-line to accountancy uncertainty) would greatly increase MBP; the 
current state of the art would provide a small benefit, but inferior equipment would not 
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provide any benefit. There are additional insights from these data, but they are addressed in 
the results for the safeguards envelope, below.  
In the case of the diversion and error required by domestic safeguards, and using the 
IAEA target values (Diversion of 0.5% vs Uncertainty of 0.2%), moderate benefit can be 
made from process monitoring. Using only level as the measurement and only the knowledge 
of the start of the transient, the increase in effective MBP is shorter than one day. Using the 
knowledge of the exact start and stop of the transients, a day of operating time can be gained. 
This increases the “uptime” to 9 of every 10 days, rather than 8 of every 9 days, a gain of 
roughly 1% in total efficiency in the facility. Note that while it may at first appear to be an 
increase of ~10% efficiency, it is assumed that the facility will operated quasicontinuously 
(i.e., as soon as one cycle is completed, it resumes operation). Flushout takes only one day, 
and return to equilibrium requires no time. With the assumptions that flushout takes a day, 
and the facility requires two days to equilibrate, the increase in efficiency is ~2.3%.  
 
Safeguards Envelope Application 
Clearly some benefits accrue from this rudimentary process-monitoring system, but 
the system could be optimized. Statistical process monitoring systems are limited by their 
fundamental data: no statistical test can make a certain conclusion on no data, and few can 
make any valuable conclusions on very limited data. Thus, the weakest points in the 
monitoring system must occur in the areas of the lowest data (hence the use of the transient 
Event #1 rather than a simple fill or simple flush operation). The expectation values of 
Equations 32 and 33 should still be zero (because this is more data that are distributed about 
zero, this make sense) but the variance should increase. Similarly, the likelihood of detection 
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of a diverted case continues to have an expectation value of the diversion with an increase in 
variance, but the additional data are more likely to push the measured value to the 
expectation value.  
An increase in data comes at a cost. Increasing the measurement points using the 
already existing equipment (presuming they are measuring as soon as they are cleared) 
requires that operations be executed slowly as compared to their original operating speed. 
Thus, there is a tradeoff: operations may be slower, but the plant would be able to operate 
longer. The amount of slow down in the process must be kept to an absolute minimum: that 
is, to the immediate fill-flush events (2.2% operating time). The idea of slowing a process 
down in order to increase throughput seems highly counterintuitive, but like the proverbial 
tortoise and hare, it is likely that the slower but longer operations complete more operations 
in the same amount of time.  
This increase in operations also must be evaluated as part of the security and safety 
envelopes. A decrease in operating speed does not, at first glance, appear to cause a change 
to the security of the material, especially under the assumptions currently posited by the 
USDOE. Traditional wisdom also suggests that slowing operations down would not induce 
safety issues, as the pressures would decrease, material would have lower velocity (at least 
not increasing wear on the pipes), and less pumping power would be required. Therefore, a 
back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that efficiency in reprocessing can be increased by 
reducing safeguards burden while maintaining the same levels of safety and security. 
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Illustration of the Safeguards Envelope Method  
As an example of safeguards envelope, consider the case in which the fill-flush 
transient (Event #1) is reduced to half speed to allow for more data to be available to the 
process monitoring system. To simulate half speed operation, the “true” data sets were 
linearly interpolated to create an additional datapoint. While this can cause some issues with 
the smoothing at the very top of the curve, it should add error rather than reduce it with the 
Kernel smoothing and is a conservative assumption.v Using a similar procedure to that 
described above, a Markov Monte Carlo chain was created for each set. In each trial, the 
errors were added randomly as above, and then the historical set was smoothed by the use of 
Kernel regression. The cumulative residuals were used as the basis for testing as their mean 
should be zero and this has historical success. 500,000 runs were used to evaluate the 
probabilities but 100,000 runs were repeated as part of code-checking. As each data point 
was added, a cumulative residual test was used to determine if the event (at that point) had 
exceeded the threshold. This type of test does not require the exact stop time of the transient 
and was used as a Z or student-t test. Using the assumption that the exact stop time was used, 
a second final cumulative sum test was used with a students-t test. A multivariate test was 
also used, but the data were determined to be circumspect. The thresholds for these tests were 
altered incrementally, to determine the optimal thresholds.  
Several variables were tested. Multiple case numbers were run to establish the 
uncertainty in the final results through the code. A test including level, density, and 
temperature with Kernel regression is the first test because density and temperature are not 
expected to contribute significantly to detection, but may contribute to false alarm rate. A 
                                                 
v
 Consider the case of two points opposite with the true maximum between them: linear interpolation will tend 
to suggest material removal, which is conservative in PND and nonconservative in FAR.  
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second test focusing only on level is next, followed by a final test in which the Chi-squared 
test is not applied for comparison. 
 
Results of the Safeguards Envelope Operation  
The results of the example basic process monitoring are below as Table 2 for three 
diversion percentages.  
Table 2. The results of the safeguards envelope application. 
 
Diversion of 0.5% vs Error of 0.1%       
        
Cases  
FAR –
Base 
PND -
Base 
MBP –
Base 
FAR -
SE 
PND-
SE 
MBP -
SE 
10000 AllVariables   0.00% 0.99% 12.96 0.43% 0.00% >30 
 Level 0.01% 0.13% >30 0.58% 0.00% >30 
 Level (No Chi2) 0.00% 0.19% 23.99 0.00% 0.00% >30 
100000 AllVariables  0.00% 0.91% 13.19 0.52% 0.01% >30 
 Level 0.30% 0.13% >30 0.55% 0.00% >30 
 Level (No Chi2) 0.05% 0.15% >30 0.02% 0.00% >30 
100000 AllVariables  0.00% 0.89% 13.24 0.52% 0.00% >30 
 Level 0.00% 0.14% >30 0.53% 0.00% >30 
 Level (No Chi2) 0.01% 0.13% >30 0.02% 0.00% >30 
100000 AllVariables  0.00% 0.92% 13.21 0.53% 0.00% >30 
 Level 0.01% 0.14% >30 0.54% 0.00% >30 
 Level (No Chi2) 0.30% 0.15% >30 0.00% 0.00% >30 
500000 AllVariables  0.00% 0.89% 13.24 0.55% 0.00% >30 
 Level 0.00% 0.16% 28.74 0.53% 0.00% >30 
 Level (No Chi2) 0.00% 0.15% >30 0.00% 0.00% >30 
  
                   Diversion of 0.5% vs Error of 0.2% 
        
        
Cases  
FAR -
Base 
PND -
Base 
MBP –
Base 
FAR -
SE 
PND-
SE 
MBP -
SE 
10000 AllVariables  1.52% 10.23% 9.14 1.19% 1.33% 11.82 
 Level 3.49% 5.54% 8.91 2.74% 0.31% 15.45 
 Level (No Chi2) 3.58% 6.31% 8.76 2.16% 0.36% 15.24 
100000 AllVariables  1.44% 10.36% 9.16 1.19% 1.29% 11.88 
 Level 3.45% 6.17% 8.85 2.81% 0.34% 14.90 
 Level (No Chi2) 3.93% 6.06% 8.89 2.42% 0.42% 14.31 
100000 AllVariables  1.46% 10.28% 9.16 1.18% 1.29% 11.89 
 Level 3.49% 6.24% 8.81 2.79% 0.35% 14.82 
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Table 2 Continued 
 
Level (No Chi2) 3.51% 6.13% 8.82 2.42% 0.37% 14.88 
100000 AllVariables  1.50% 10.35% 9.14 1.15% 1.34% 11.82 
 Level 3.49% 6.24% 8.81 2.83% 0.38% 14.33 
 Level (No Chi2) 3.40% 6.08% 8.88 2.42% 0.40% 14.50 
500000 AllVariables  1.48% 10.30% 9.15 1.17% 1.26% 11.94 
 Level 3.40% 6.14% 8.88 2.86% 0.35% 14.66 
 Level (No Chi2) 3.48% 6.16% 8.83 2.42% 0.40% 14.47 
 
Diversion of 0.5% vs Error of 0.3% 
Cases  
FAR –
Base 
PND -
Base 
MBP -
Base 
FAR -
SE 
PND-
SE 
MBP –
SE 
10000 AllVariables  11.09% 19.21% 8.00 10.10% 5.59% 8.00 
 Level 16.40% 14.56% 8.00 12.67% 4.29% 8.00 
 Level (No Chi2) 16.30% 14.65% 8.00 10.34% 4.51% 8.00 
100000 AllVariables  10.85% 19.11% 8.00 0.97% 0.54% 8.00 
 Level 0.16% 14.56% 8.00 12.75% 3.89% 8.00 
 Level (No Chi2) 16.28% 14.33% 8.00 10.27% 4.89% 8.00 
100000 AllVariables  10.78% 19.45% 8.00 9.78% 5.75% 8.00 
 Level 16.37% 14.55% 8.00 12.66% 4.06% 8.00 
 Level (No Chi2) 16.54% 14.59% 8.00 10.39% 5.01% 8.00 
100000 AllVariables  10.88% 19.11% 8.00 9.79% 5.28% 8.00 
 Level 16.32% 14.58% 8.00 12.26% 3.86% 8.00 
 Level (No Chi2) 16.57% 14.57% 8.00 10.36% 4.86% 8.00 
500000 AllVariables  10.91% 19.25% 8.00 9.80% 5.39% 8.00 
 Level 16.42% 14.54% 8.00 12.57% 3.97% 8.00 
 Level (No Chi2) 16.27% 14.53% 8.00 10.31% 5.06% 8.00 
  
      
  
      
 
The results for Safeguards Envelope process monitoring suggest that highly accurate 
online measurements (similar on-line to accountancy uncertainty) would greatly increase 
MBP even over basic process monitoring. The reporting period for this type of material is 
one month. Envelope operation, applied to highly accurate measurements, could yield drastic 
increases in efficiency. In the case of basic process monitoring, the difference between all 
variables and only a limited subset (testing for an expected diversion) is very large. This 
suggests that, as additional nondestructive analysis techniques are brought online, envelope 
operation becomes even more relevant. This example case is not currently applicable, 
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however, because the on-line measurements that are available do not have this level of 
accuracy.  
In the case of the standard diversion against the state of the art for measurements, the 
basic process monitoring change in MBP between multiple variables and level is less 
pronounced in this diversion percentage than in the prior example. Basic process monitoring 
also shows that adding or removing a more advanced test (for example, the Chi-square) has 
only a limited impact on MBP. Safeguards Envelope operation did significantly increase 
MBP, and the difference between a known and unknown diversion was much more 
pronounced. The calculation for efficiency becomes more complicated, however. Because a 
subset of the operations of the facility are at half speed, the efficiency decrease through this 
choice of operation could be between 1.1% and 2.2%, depending whether the half-speed 
operations can be performed simultaneously or must be explicitly staggered (this is 
unrealistic, since tanks are connected). The increase in uptime, assuming a twelve day MBP 
using slightly more optimized thresholds and simultaneous half speed operations, would 
result in an efficiency increase of 1.2%. A perfectly staggered half-speed operation for two 
tanks would reduce this to roughly 0.1% efficiency increase. However, if it is assumed that 
flush-outs require three days, these efficiency impacts become 3.9% and 2.8% respectively, 
quite significant considering operational cost of ICPP was approximately $1 million/hrvi. 
The application of the safeguards envelope in the case of inferior equipment does not 
generate any efficiency increase. It is worth noting that the FAR and PND are both reduced 
significantly under SE operation, but in this regime, accountancy measurements clearly 
dominate process-monitoring applications.  
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Safety and Security Considerations in this Envelope Operation 
Though there is proven benefit from a safeguards perspective in this relatively simple 
change of operation, the safety and security concerns that were only cursorily considered 
must be evaluated in more detail. The safety envelope within which the facility operated is 
not available in the public domain, nor are the exact security configurations and systems. 
Expert elicitation was used as a surrogate, in the framework of PRA for safety and the DOE 
Security Orders for Security. 
The major classes of accident in the hypothetical PRA would have been those 
discussed in the prior chapters: irrecoverable damage, recoverable damage, and threat to the 
public. Because only one subsystem is altered in this example envelope, and there are only a 
few modes of failure for a tank, it is not an insurmountable problem to estimate the effects of 
the suggested changes. The impact of risk is broken down into probability of an event and its 
consequences. The change in risk as a result of slowing down operations initially appears 
very low. The tank is clearly designed to operate for long periods of time with material in it, 
and so an increase in material holding for short periods of time does not appear to increase 
the risk of either corrosive tank failure or plugging. Similarly, the material is no more 
dangerous as a result of residence time than the other materials.  
However, consulting with prior employees reveals that the flushouts prior to tank fill 
had a major and minor purpose. The major purpose was to ensure that the tank was fully 
cleared of material, but the minor purpose was to reduce the amount of hydrofluoric acid 
(HF) resident in the accountancy tank. Because of the multiple-head-end structure of the 
facility (see Figure 1 in prior chapter), HF was used for some dissolutions. The accountancy 
tank was not made of the steels, very highly resistant to HF and HNO3, that are available 
                                                 
vi
 ~5000 employees at $200/hr with overhead ~$1mil/hr. 
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today, but used the technology available in the 1950s. Some tanks were better able to handle 
HF, but would have been corroded by HNO3, allowing for dissolution of material in HF and 
storage, but both HF and HNO3 lines entered the accountancy tank. Counter to intuition, the 
envelope operation suggested may have actually increased risk because of increased 
residency of HF; a valve or pipes connected to the accountancy were more likely to be 
corroded.  
There is a relatively simple solution to the corrosion problem: an increased 
maintenance of the valves that would be corroded by HF. Corrosion and replacement of 
valves was a common problem, but a major failure and subsequent leak of HF and spent fuel 
would have been extremely expensive in terms of time and money. An extremely large 
release would have been even more dangerous for humans because the facility was, at the 
time, pushing the boundaries for exposure to HF. HF causes irreversible heart damage and 
failure with relatively small chemical doses, and some former workers anecdotally mention 
that it was a major concern of the plant.  
The security perspective also suggested little to no change at first calculation; the 
DOE Security Orders provide no benefits or drawbacks for material residence time. Work by 
Citpiti and Duran, however, suggests process monitoring models that adjust the alert status of 
the physical security force against the insider and insider–with-collusion threat.28 In this case, 
the increased detection probability directly results in a more timely response from the 
physical security force. This work suggests that increases in detection and neutralization 
increase with a process monitoring detection as physical security forces are then placed on 
higher alert. The generalization of this method has not been publicly released, but this 
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suggests that the example envelope would significantly increase the physical security against 
two of the three major threats.  
This example shows that a thorough understanding of the plant is required and that 
the operating space must be designed from all aspects: safety, security, and safeguards.  
 
Limitations of the Safeguards Envelope Application 
This example envelope is not the fully optimized envelope and will not catch all 
possible diversions. Complexity in the number of variables and systems prevents an easy 
optimization. In a similar manner to the adjustments to load-cells required for relative 
humidity and air density, precise determination of the exact optimal parameters will require 
extensive start-up testing.  
When simulations are available, and these parameters are being estimated through 
models, it becomes much easier to explore the parameter space and determine potential 
optimal operations. Unfortunately, the size and versatility of bulk processing nuclear 
facilities and the flexible requirements of detection and false alarm for each subsystem create 
an exceptionally large number of variables. An example set of variables this analysis: (1) L-
norm level, (2) threshold for the student’s-t test, (3) threshold for the Chi-Square test, (4) 
amount of slowing down over transients, (5) time-location of the slowdown, (6) kernel 
bandwidth for kernel regression, (7) weight per kernel residual, (8) acceptable confidence 
intervals, (9)  number of intervals for the Chi-Square test, (10) number of tests per 
cumulative sum, and (11) amount of rebaselining per test. It must be assumed that:  
1) Each variable contributes in at least a linear fashion, 
2) Some variables contribute in nonlinear fashions, and 
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3) Independence is not expected from any variables. 
Because the nonlinear nature of the interaction is unknown, this can be approximated 
by a series of exponentials or polynomials. For the sake of simplicity, this analysis will use 
polynomials. In this case, the final effect on the FAR, PND, and MBP are specific 
expressions of the generalized equation:  
qr4)M):s  * * :* c4cM:csWt	Wt-' :Wtuvcs0
cM0
c40
  ( 43) 
In equation 43, the each  is a determined coefficient of the factors, which is given 
by the various x. Determining the coefficients of the factors of the infinite sum is not feasible 
with modern computational methods as the amount of factors limit to infinity. The nonlinear 
character of the interaction makes standard regression analysis useless unless enough cases 
were run to isolate the interaction of each variable.  
Previous analysis using Markov Monte-Carlo evaluated the PND and FAR with a 
running time of roughly an hour per analysis. Each adjustment to each variable required an 
entirely new run. Under a broad assumption that each variable requires ten settings to explore 
the entire parameter space, the time required for a complete exploration is 10N hours.  
This can be accelerated by deconstructing the analysis into group families, but this 
can ultimately only reduce the number of calculations to a loss of two degrees of freedom. 
While a reduction by two orders of magnitude may seem significant, this analytical method 
still cannot be pursued. The required time has led to the requirement of seeking secondary 
methods of evaluating the most relevant factors in the parameter space.  
A method developed for exploring extremely large parameter spaces in operations 
analysis is the 2k factorial analysis. In this analysis, an arbitrarily high and an arbitrarily low 
value is assigned for each one of the potential quantitative variables. Note that some 
70 
 
 
 
variables, such as diversion-type, are qualitative, and so a subset of qualitative variables must 
be chosen.  
This can reduce the number of independent tests to factors of two. There are several 
assumptions in this model, however: 
1) Each variable has only first order interaction with each other variable, 
2) Each variable has only first order impact into the final function, and  
3) Choice of "high" and "low" values are not the absolute limit and represent 
"appropriate" values for the quantitative measure.  
The third assumption is not difficult to overcome for most of the conditions listed. 
For example, p values for the statistical tests of the Chi-Square and the student's-t test are 
unlikely to 0.50, and are much more likely to be appropriate in the standard tests of p=0.05 or 
p=0.01. The first and second assumptions, however, are not appropriate for this model. It is 
reasonable to expect that a student's-t test on the residuals and a Chi-Square test on the 
absolute variance are poorly estimated by a “high” and a “low” variable test set. These 
functions should have multi-order impact, and would not even be linearly independent. As a 
result, the proposed approach of the 2k factorial method was not applied.  
The envelope suggested is based on process monitoring available in an example 
facility. No systems are added to detect diversions that the original configuration would not 
have detected, though some diversions do become harder to execute under envelope 
operation. Five of these diversions are provided below as examples:  
1) A diversion which removes material between the penultimate and final points in a 
transient is strictly undetectable. The expected value of the last point is explicitly 
zero, and there is no knowledge of the intervening time. All statistical tests should 
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provide the same result of no diversion. Slower operations reduce the amount of 
material that can be removed by half, but only the inclusion of multi-tank analysis 
and rigorous testing of the systematic error drift of multiple tanks (which could be 
significant) could prevent this diversion. 
2) A diversion which removed material during a statistically rare event, such as 
abnormally high reading due to systematic error or weather conditions would be 
similarly undetectable. Consider the far-fetched case of diversion during a tornado or 
tropical depression. The change in atmospheric pressure would suggest more material 
is present than actually is, allowing for removal. A second example: a diverter could 
wait for an event that is reading abnormally high through random occurrence, 
effectively turning what would have been an anomalously high event (which 
safeguards staff neither record nor regard) into a normal event. Multitank analysis 
would be required to attempt detection; the anomalous weather event would be 
detected as that tank presenting as a statistical outlier, but the high-to-normal event 
diversion would still not be detected.  
3) A diversion which includes a synthetic control system reading through an insider 
cyberattack would render the entire system irrelevant. Comparison to normal 
historical cases is used, but there is no test to determine if an event is identical to a 
prior event. In fact, if the historical curves are known to the operator, as expected, and 
the operator simulates the facility for efficiency calculations, the tools likely already 
exist for this type of spoofing. Appropriate Design Information Verification (DIV), 
resilient control systems, and information security must be added.   
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4) A diversion which feeds material into a tank at the same rate as removal would be 
difficult to detect. In the example envelope presented, the density and temperature 
conditions were not used as part of the process monitoring suite. However, even if 
they were included, addition of iron dissolved in nitric acid at the appropriate 
temperature would spoof the system. Without additional process-monitoring 
variables, the process monitoring system simply cannot detect this advanced 
diversion.  
5) A diversion which occurs during events external to the sensors, or for which there is 
no historical data set, would also defeat the monitoring system. First start ups, 
introduction of new additives, or major and uncommon maintenance would rely on 
(potentially) flawed simulations. This diversion is notable, however, for being 
external to the operating envelope explicitly, and so it is handled by the methodology.   
Additionally, the suggested results assume that only the accountancy tank operation is 
changed. If fill and flush is very common in the rest of the plant, the effective efficiency 
increase from the provided envelope would not be as significant. From looking at the 
surrounding tanks in the head-end process, the fill/flush operation is much less common but 
the exact operations inside of the rest of the facility are not known.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A new framework for safeguards is needed to increase the viability of the closed 
nuclear fuel cycle. Modern safeguards application is a defense in depth, layering barriers to 
prevent the loss of material, but with no integration with operations and often acting counter 
to the facility’s efficiency. Significant prior works have developed the advanced tools and 
methods to include transparency measures such as process monitoring, as part of the 
safeguards suite, with only limited implementation. This Dissertation suggests a new 
paradigm to safeguards: operational integration instead of a layering of defense.  
Through an example facility, using real recorded data, this work demonstrates the 
viability of this methodology. The example envelope for the head-end process of the Idaho 
Chemical Processing Plant showed significant efficiency increases, despite operating some 
areas of the facility more slowly, with minimal impact to the safety or security of the facility. 
The presented example was limited in computational power; even more significant increases 
in efficiency may have been established if the parameter space could have been explored 
more fully.  
This methodology provides an opportunity to fully integrate safeguards into an as-
built facility, but there are limitations in application currently. These limitations suggest 
significant future work: modern techniques previously unavailable to contribute to 
quantitative safeguards can be included as part of the safeguards suite, the expanse of the 
optimization variables requires significant research to determine efficient optimization 
techniques, new data processing and statistical tests may detect diversion more easily, and 
each facility type may have unique advantages or challenges to applying the methodology.   
74 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1.  AREVA. "Nuclear Power: Selective Separation and Recycling." 
http://www.areva.com/EN/operations-1370/nuclear-waste-recycling-and-treatment.html. 
(2010). 
2.  Bathke, C. et al. "The Attractiveness of Materials in Advanced NUclear Fuel Cycles for 
Various Proliferation and Theft Scenarios." LA-UR-09-02466. (2009). 
3.  DOE-M-470.4-6. http://www.hss.energy.gov/NMMSS/pdfs/m4704-6c1.pdf. Website 
accessed Aug (2011). 
4.  Ehinger, M. "Process Monitoring in International Safeguards for Reprocessing Plans - A 
Demonstration." ORNL/TM-10912. (1989). 
5.  Personal Conversation with Michael Ehinger. Contact Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
(2009). 
6.  Wei, T, and J. Reifman. "PRODIAG Combined Expert System/Neural Network for 
Process Fault Diagnosis." ANL/RE/RP-89482. (1994). 
7.  Morman, J.A. et al. " IGENPRO Knowledge-based Digital System for Process-transient 
Diagnostics and Management." IAEA Meeting on Advanced Technologies for Improving 
Availability and Reliability of Current and Future Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants. 8-11 
September 1997, Argonne National Laboratory, Chicago, IL. (1997). 
8.  Wei, T. et al. "Signal Trend Identification with Fuzzy Methods." IEEE International 
Conference on Information, Intelligence, and Systems. Bethesda, MD. (1999).  
9.  Burr, T., Coulter, A., Howell, J., Wangen, L., “Solution Monitoring: Quantitative and 
Qualitative Benefits to Safeguards” J. Nucl. Sci. and Tech. 40(4): 256-263, (2003). 
75 
 
 
 
10.  Burr, T., Hamada, M., “Measurement Error Modelling and Simulation for Solution 
Monitoring” LAUR08-06399. (2008). 
11.  Burr, T., Hamada, M., Howell, J., “Multivariate Statistical Process Monitoring Options 
for Solution Monitoring” LAUR08-06290. (2008). 
12.  Burr, T., Ehinger, M., Howell, J., “A Review of Process Monitoring for Safeguards” 8th 
International Conference on Facility Operations - Safeguards Interface, Portland, OR, (2008). 
13.  Burr, T., Howell, J., Longo, C., Suzuki, M., “Change Detection in Solution Monitoring 
for Safeguards” Proc. INMM, (2009). 
14.  Howell J., Scothern, S., “An Explicit Model-Based Diagnostic Approach In A Plutonium 
Nitrate Tank Storage Facility” J. Cont. Eng. Prac., 8(6), pp 645-656, ISSN: 0967-0661, 
(2000). 
 15. Howell J., Miller, E.,  “Evaluation of Process Information to Obtain Additional 
Safeguards Assurances in Reprocessing Plants” UK R&D Programme in Support of IAEA 
Safeguards. SRDP-R279. (2001). 
16.  Howell, J., Binner, R. , Bevan, G., Sirajov, B., “Tank Monitoring Evaluation Systems: 
Methods and Algorithms” Proc. INMM, (2009). 
17.  Burr, T. and Wangen, L. "Process Fault Detection and Nonlinear Time Series Analysis 
for Anomaly Detection in Safeguards." LAUR-04-0171. (1994).  
18.  Ansolabehere, S., et al. “The Future of Nuclear Power” Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. ISBN:0-615-12420-8. (2003).   
19.  Garcia, M.L., Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems: Second Edition. 
Elsevier/Butterworth-Heinemann. Waltham, MA. (2001).  
76 
 
 
 
20.  Garcia, M.L., Vulnerability Assessment of Physical Protection Systems. 
Elsevier/Butterworth-Heinemann. Waltham, MA. (2006). 
 21. Cipiti, B.B., Durán, F., Middleton, B., Ward R.,"Fully Integrated Safeguards and 
Security for Reprocessing Plant Monitoring" SAND2011-7292. (2011). 
22.  DeMott, D.L. "PRA as a Design Tool" Proceedings - Annual Reliability and 
Maintainability Symposium.  San Jose, CA. (2011). 
23.  H. Aigner et al, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in 
Safeguarding Nuclear Materials”, Intern. Atomic Energy Agency, STR-327. ( 2001). 
24.  Personal Email: John Howell. University Glasgow. (2011).  
 25.  Binner, R., Howell, J., Janssens-Maenhout, G., Sellingshegg, D.,  Zhao, K., “Practical 
Issues Relating to Tank Volume Determination.” J. Ind. Eng. Chem. Res., 27, 1533-1545. 
(2008).  
26.  Howell, J. “Towards the Re-verification of Process Tank Calibrations.” Trans. of the 
Inst. of Meas. and Cont., 31 (2). pp. 117-128. ISSN 0142-3312 (2009). 
27.  Teknomo, K., “Kernel Regression”. Accessed July 2009.  
http://people.revoledu.com/kardi/tutorial/regression/kernelregression/ (2007). 
28.  Cipiti, B. B., Duran, F., Merkel, P., Tolk, K., "Data Validation and Security for 
Reprocessing"  SAND20008-6458. (2008).  
77 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1  
    DATA RECOVERY  
 
A significant portion of this appendix is from Summary of Data Recovery Efforts to 
Date Available in the DOE Complex, INL-EXT-09-17374. 
 
Data Retrieval  
The data retrieval effort took on three parts: raw data, metadata, and open search. 
Raw process monitoring data files were transferred from magnetic tapes to an optical drive, 
where they were copied to a single database. Once that database was restored, the data were 
copied to flat files and entered into a new database.  
Metadata, containing computed and applied ICPP process monitoring information, 
were in storage at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC), formerly 
known as the ICPP. Of these data, only campaigns 38 and 40 were obtained, which consisted 
of approximately 2000 pages of information. These hard copy files were then scanned and 
stored in .PDF format, organized by campaign, month, and batch.  
An open search conducted primarily through INL’s Electronic Document 
Management System (EDMS) has produced details of plant operation, the process 
monitoring system and other manuals.  
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Description of the ICPP Facility 
Completed in 1953, the ICPP was designed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
(ORNL) personnel to process several types of fuel: aluminum clad fuel from the Material 
Test Reactor, unclad Experimental Breeder Reactor I (EBR-I) fuel, and Hanford producing 
fuel. The amount and type of fuels processed at the ICPP expanded throughout its operational 
history. During forty years of operation, the facility reprocessed fuel from nearly 100 tests 
and research facilities around the world and ultimately recovered approximately 32 metric 
tons of uranium.  
The ICPP was equipped with several head-end dissolution processes capable of 
dissolving the aluminum-, zirconium-, stainless steel-, and custom-clad fuels. The main 
extraction process separated uranium through a tributyl phosphate (TBP) extraction cycle 
followed by two methyl isobutyl ketone (MIBK) extraction cycles. The resulting uranyl 
nitrate entered a denitrator and was almost instantaneously converted to uranium trioxide. 
This solid product was then put into cans, measured for accountability, and shipped to the 
customer. 
 
Operational Capacity 
The processing complex consisted of five interconnected facilities: CPP-601, CPP-
627, CPP-640, CPP-602 and CPP-630. The first three were dissolution and extraction 
facilities while the last two were denitration and support facilities. The extraction cycles were 
housed within 29 cells in CPP-601. These cells were assigned letters of the alphabet and had 
different capabilities. G Cell contained the aluminum dissolution process and initial 
accountability tanks. The TBP extraction took place in G and H Cells and the MIBK 
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extractions were in P and Q Cells. Other cells like M and N were for intercycle sampling and 
storage. A process makeup area above the operating cells housed the acid and water makeup 
tanks.   
Instruments, tanks, and pipes were named with the cell letter and a corresponding 
number depending on the type of equipment. For example, G-105 was a tank in G Cell and 
F-55 is a valve in F Cell. For further explanation of instrument nomenclature, see Appendix 
1. The equipment within the cells was controlled within the operating corridor; a long 
hallway in the center of the building separated the two sets of operating cells. 
Before processing, expended fuel was stored on site in four storage facilities. These 
irradiated and unirradiated fuels included uranium metal; uranium metal clad in aluminum, 
zirconium, stainless steel or other special metals; uranium alloyed with those metals; uranium 
oxide; and other uranium ceramics. The unirradiated fuels were stored in an aboveground 
building or buried-in-earth, caisson-type containers. Irradiated fuels were most often stored 
in water basins between 20 and 44 ft deep or within shielded air-cooled rooms encased in 
buried-in-earth, caisson-type containers. They were required to have at least 90 days of 
cooling before entering the dissolution process although the cooling period would often be 
for much longer than this in order to collect enough of the same type of fuel to run a specific 
dissolution process.    
After the required cooling period was complete, the fuel was transferred from storage 
into a charging cell and subsequently entered the head-end dissolution process appropriate 
for its makeup. Aluminum fuels were dissolved in nitric acid with a mercuric sulfate as a 
catalyst. Zirconium fuels were dissolved in hydrofluoric acid and nitric acid with an electric 
current running through the solution. Stainless steel fuels were dissolved in nitric acid with 
80 
 
 
 
an electric current running through the solution. Graphite fuels were burned in oxygen, and 
the leftover metals were also dissolved in hydrofluoric and nitric acids. The custom 
processing facility dissolved small quantities of uniquely clad fuels. After the dissolution was 
complete, any deficiencies that were found in the uranium solution were corrected, and it was 
sampled for uranium content in accountability tanks. Once all of the chemical analyses were 
completed and approved, the solution was sent to the first cycle extraction process. 
The uranium was removed by aqueous-organic extraction. These chemical 
separations occurred in countercurrent pulse-plate or packed columns. Following the first 
cycle, the uranyl nitrate solution was sent to M Cell for intercycle accountability and then to 
N Cell for intercycle storage. The second and third cycle extractions were run to extract as 
much uranium as possible. After the three cycles were complete and the uranyl nitrate was 
sufficiently pure, it was again sent to M Cell for accountability and then to Z Cell where it 
was stored. The uranyl nitrate then entered the fluidized-bed denitrator, where it was 
converted to uranium oxide.  
Radioactive waste from the uranium dissolution and extraction was also treated at the 
ICPP. The high level radioactive waste that was removed during the first extraction cycle and 
was stored indefinitely as a calcined solid similar to sand. The low-level radioactive waste 
produced from the second and third cycles were stored in one of three 300,000 gallon tanks. 
 
Operational History 
From the beginning, the ICPP was a dynamic facility where new technologies were 
implemented on a frequent basis. The first campaign at the ICPP began in February of 1953. 
The first seven fuel campaigns used methyl isobutyl ketone (MIBK) in all three extraction 
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cycles. In 1955, the first extraction cycle changed from MIBK to tributyl phosphate (TBP) 
extraction. This upgrade was beneficial because it did not require the first-cycle dissolver 
product to be preconcentrated. TBP extraction also allowed the plant to operate on a more 
continuous basis because the first cycle could operate at the same time as the fuel dissolution. 
The treatment of high-level waste was altered in 1964 when the Waste Calcination Facility 
(CPP-633) began to calcinate liquid waste into granular solids. A year later, the ICPP 
integrated a custom fuel processing facility where less conventional fuels could be dissolved.   
Up until 1971, the final-product uranyl nitrate was stored in 10 liter polyethylene 
bottles. At this time, the denitrator process was developed in CPP-602 to convert the liquid 
uranyl nitrate into solid uranium trioxide, increasing the total amount of final product able to 
be stored in a given volume. About 85% of the entire uranium product was shipped to Y-12 
in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Most of the remaining 15% was shipped to Portsmouth Gaseous 
Diffusion Plant in Ohio. Small amounts of fuel were sent to other national laboratories for 
research purposes. These shipments continued from 1953 to 1998. 
 In 1973 the electrolytic dissolution process was installed into CPP-640, allowing for 
the dissolution of the stainless steel fuel from Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II). In 
1981, the ICPP was equipped with the Process Monitoring Computer System (PMCS), the 
main purpose of which was to provide high quality processing information to operations, 
safeguards, and support staffs. 1983 saw the development of the ROVER (Nuclear Rocket) 
fuel recovery. Three years later, in 1986, zirconium-alloyed fuel dissolution was added 
allowing for the processing of navy fuels.   
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 The plant was temporarily shut down in 1988 to update the underground piping in 
compliance with Environmental Protection Agency regulations. This was a significant 
undertaking for the facility. No major uranium extractions were performed after this time 
because the Secretary of Energy stopped all spent nuclear fuel processing in the United States 
in 1992. The uranium solution left in the plant in 1992 was finally processed in 1996 and 
shipped in 1998.   
 In October of 1994 the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory released its plan for 
decommissioning the ICPP, identifying which facilities would be destroyed or have their 
efforts redirected. Due to all of the recent changes, the ICPP has been renamed Idaho Nuclear 
Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC). 
 
Process Monitoring System 
In order to decrease inadvertent transfers and operator error, and to test the utility of 
process monitoring for safeguards, the ICPP was retrofitted with monitoring instruments and 
a computer system. Information such as pressure, flow rate, and on/off status of valves and 
samplers was recorded. The instrumentation was updated as new technologies were 
developed throughout the next decade. By the end of the 1980’s, this retrofit was capable of 
monitoring 1500 variables from 125 different process vessels throughout the extraction 
process. A description of the PMCS and its accompanying instrumentation is discussed 
below. 
The PMCS was a set of programs used to store, analyze and graph process 
information and was installed on multiple VAX 11/780 and MicroVAX II computers within 
buildings CPP-601 and CPP-602. Three hundred and ninety-five analog signals were 
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gathered by scanivalve controllers and 4 analog multiplexers. Four Digital Controllers 
gathered 484 on/off signals for pumps, jets, airlifts and samplers. All of this information was 
scanned once per minute and stored in an on-line database for one year, which was made 
available to operating, security, and safeguards staff. After one year, data from every fourth 
minute were permanently stored on magnetic tapes. Further information concerning forms 
and procedures used can be fount in “The Users Guide to the PMCS Revision 3” . 
 
Instrumentation 
Scanivalves are pneumatic devices that convert analog signals, such as pressure, into 
digital signals usable by the PMCS. Three 64-bit scanivalves were installed in the ICPP in 
1982. With an accuracy of 1%, the scanivalves were the best technology of the time. 
However, they often encountered electrical noise problems and occasionally reported false 
short-duration changes in their readings. Because of the nature of the nuclear material, the 
scanivalves had to be operated remotely. This was accomplished by using AMDUX-12 
Recording Devices which also did on line pressure correction computations. 
The Precision Level/Density Scanners (PLDS) recorded accurate measurements of 
the solution densities and tank levels throughout the process. There were four PLDS installed 
outside of E, G, J, and N Cells, and one inside of Z Cell. Through scanivalves, the pneumatic 
pressures were multiplexed into two Digiquartz high-precision differential-pressure 
transducers. For a given tank, three dip tubes measured pressure at various points within the 
tank. (R) measured the reference pressure, (D) measured the pressure at a given depth within 
the tank, and (L) measured the pressure at a specific height above the bottom of the tank, as 
is demonstrated in the figure below. These Digiquartz transducers output electrical signals 
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representing pressure differences (LR and DR) and temperature that were later interpreted by 
a computer.  
 
 
Figure 21. Crude diagram of the dip tube set-up within a tank.  
 
The Liquid-in-Line sensors detected the presence of a fluid in air or instrument lines. 
They were placed in areas that would only have liquid in emergencies, mechanical failures, 
or diversion attempts. Three different types of sensors were tested between 1980 and 1981. 
The ultrasonic sensor could detect the presence of liquid in pipes smaller than 1/2 in. thick. 
The thermal sensor checked for temperature changes that would occur as liquid flowed 
through the pipe. Finally, the vacuum sensor was an invasive way of testing whether or not 
solution was siphoned out. The ultrasonic and thermal sensors were non-intrusive, whereas 
the vacuum sensor was, by nature, intrusive. 
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Pressure switches monitored steam jets, sample air jets, and remote-controlled valves. 
These were prone to provide false indications, however, when the control valves were 
leaking. 
Process Liquid Flow Monitors were used to track fluid moving throughout the 
process. They were non-intrusive and detected temperature changes by moving fluid through 
a heated insulated section of pipe. Air-flow monitors were used for observing air sparge 
mixing, sampler air lifts and process air lifts where the flow rate exceeded 1.5 ft3 per minute. 
However, nothing suitable was found for monitoring sample air lifts because the flow rates 
were too low. 
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Available Data Description 
Raw Data 
The raw data were obtained from magnetic tapes containing over six gigabytes of 
information. These span from October of 1986 through April 1996. Over this 10-year period, 
data were recorded from many tanks, centrifuges, evaporators, valves, jets and air lifts. Some 
of these data simply consisted of either a 1 or a 0, indicating whether a piece of equipment 
was activated or not. Only the centrifuges had speed indicators, and dissolvers only contained 
information for off-gas control signals or charge soot hydraulics.  
The most valuable process monitoring data are associated with the accountability 
tanks, feed tanks, and sample pots, which consist of raw measured data obtained from 
Digiquartz transducers. These transducers measure pressure and temperature differences in 
the tanks or pots. These LR and DR pressure differences are used to calculate 
density/specific gravity, volume, and level of material in the tank. 
Density is calculated by taking the difference between LR and DR and dividing that 
by the product of the acceleration due to gravity (g) and a known height (H) between dip tube 
D and dip tube L shown Equation A1. Volume and level are calculated with added constants 
and coefficients not described in detail here. 
gH
DRLR −
=ρ  (A1) 
The raw data are currently accessible in either Microsoft Excel or text format. The pressure 
measurement error associated with the dip tubes is extremely small. With no noise, level 
calculations from pressure measurements reach less than 0.015%. 
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Metadata 
The collected metadata were from campaigns 38 and 40 which covered September 
1982 through January 1983 and September 1985 through January 1986, respectively. 
Included in these data are isotope concentrations, isotope ratios, chemical make-up of the 
fuel being reprocessed, shipper/receiver differences, campaign summaries, and product-can 
outputs. The metadata are currently organized in PDF format by campaign, month and batch 
number. 
Several different types of forms have been recovered. Many of the measurements in 
the metadata are in milligrams per gram of uranium or grams per liter of solution. However, 
meanings of some of the acronyms and units are unknown. An attempt to describe the basic 
use of the forms and other necessary clarifications will be presented. The goal is to provide 
the interested researcher with enough information to deduce the meanings of those things that 
are not explained. 
Form 751 recorded who shipped the spent nuclear fuel, who received it, and when it 
was received by the ICPP. In order for the ICPP to receive spent nuclear fuel, the shipper was 
required to account for the amount U235 and U238 the fuel. Since this is a very difficult 
measurement to make, the best accuracy achievable was about 20%. These values declared 
by the shipper were recorded on the 741 and were legal until the product was dissolved and 
accounted for in the plant. Once the accounting analysis was completed, these values became 
the official value for the amounts of uranium present in the fuel assemblies.  
Copies of this form are not included in the Data Package due to legalities. However, 
the Transfer to Process forms included are summaries of the 741’s. 
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Shipper/Receiver Differences 
Several different versions of this form exist in the data package, but all follow a 
similar format. This form verified that what the shipper sent to the ICPP was received. 
Usually the type of fuel and the date that it was received were recorded in the first two 
columns, followed by the amounts of U238 and U235 claimed by the shipper and what was 
measured by the ICPP. The first column of values (ELEMENT) is the amount of U238 in 
grams and ISOTOPE, the second column of values is the amount of U235 in grams (see figure 
22). The final columns were the differences between the declared amounts and the measured 
amounts. They are generally within a few grams of each other. Some of the forms list the 
difference measurements by fuel element, by batches or by fuel type (see Figure 22). 
 
 
Figure 22. Example of a sender/receiver form in grams of U235.   
 
First Cycle Extraction (FCE) and 1-FU-AL Forms 
These were the forms that accounted for the amount and nature of material that 
entered the process. They specifically accounted for each batch of aluminum clad material 
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before it entered the first cycle extraction. The left-most digit in the batch number 
distinguished which route the fuel would take in the dissolution process. For example, during 
campaign 38 a batch number of 1009 meant that batch 9 of material dissolved in G-101 and 
was accounted for in tank E-103. A batch number of 2010 meant that batch 10 of material 
dissolved in G-151 and was accounted for in tank E-153. For campaign 40, a batch number 
of 1126 meant that batch 126 started in dissolver G-101 and was sampled in tank G-105. A 
batch number of 2127 meant that batch 127 went from G-151 to G-155 to be sampled.  
Included on these forms are various chemical-analysis results. Using three 
independent samples of solution, they record the uranium concentration, specific gravities, 
undissolved-solid concentration, and nitric-acid content. If the results of two samples were 
within specifications and met the accountability requirements, then the process continued. If 
the first two disagreed then the third sample was analyzed. If the third sample agreed with 
one of the other two then the process continued. However, if they could not obtain a 
satisfactory sample measurement they would stop the process and research the problem. The 
results of these forms are summarized in the RUSCA/RUSKA Measurement Data forms. 
As part of the final batch report, maximum flow rates, upper and lower limits and 
atom percentages were calculated. Some of the batch reports have gamma analyses which 
were required to verify the properties of the material. 
   
Document Change Requests 
Document Change Requests stated why the operators deviated from the original run 
plan. Such reasons range from decreasing isotope concentration to correcting a dissolution 
error. They can be found in the processing run summaries.   
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Product Denitrator System (PDS) Reports 
After the uranium completed the three extraction cycles, it was stored as uranyl 
nitrate in the Z-Cell tanks. When a sufficient amount of uranyl nitrate was collected, the 
denitrator was run to convert the uranyl nitrate to uranium trioxide (UO3) in a heated 
fluidized bed. The UO3 was stored in cans in a vault until it was shipped to Y-12 or other 
facilities. Every can was measured for its uranium content and radioactive activity. 
Additionally, the cans’ net and gross weights were also recorded. All of this information is 
found in the product can reports for runs 38 and 40.  
For accountability purposes, the data collected from the denitrator are not particularly 
helpful, because the denitrator was only run once every one or two years. It is very difficult 
to assign a specific product can to a specific batch since the uranyl nitrates from different 
runs were intermixed. In an attempt to resolve this issue, Ernest Laible of the Idaho National 
Laboratory determined which cans are most likely related to which types of fuel based on the 
cans’ uranium enrichment content. His work is summarized in Table 3.  The 741 identifiers 
are used in the fuel type column: 623-643 has 78% enrichment; some 78% some 91%. 
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Table 3. The product cans are associated with their respective fuel types.  
Fuel Type Date 
Run 
Number 
Inclusive 
Can 
Numbers 
# of 
Cans Enrichment 
JXI-FZB 3/21/1983 5 226-277 21 85.24 
JXI-FZB 7/9/1983 6 233-278 30 84.26 
JXI-FZB 1/9/1984 7 285-295 10 87.25 
JXI-FZF 9/4/1986 10 573-622 50 82.3 
JXI-FZF 9/4/1986 11 623-690 50 86.22* 
JXI-FZF 9/24/1986 12 644-658 12 82.17 
 
 
Batch Processing Schedules 
The Batch Processing Schedules for campaign 40 are very similar to the 
sender\receiver difference reports. These also include the uranium enrichment of the fuel as it 
was built. It is interesting to note that the batch numbers on the batch processing schedules 
do not match up with the batch numbers of the actual extraction process. 
 
PMCS Photographs 
Fifty-six photographs were taken in 1984 of the PMCS instrumentation in CPP-601. 
They show the pressure, temperature, and density analog recorders, valves, hallways, 
switches, and pipes that were used during this time period. Photographs can be associated 
with individual cells and processes. See Figure 23. 
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Figure 23. 1984 photograph of the PMCS equipment.   
 
Operational Reports 
A Hexone Extraction System Flush, a Flush and Sample of G-116, and a G-Cell 
Vessel Flush were recovered with the help of Phil Winston. These three operational reports 
explain clean-out operations which occurred in 1993 and 1994. They give detailed process 
information, such as how the fluid moved throughout the process, what valves were to be 
opened and in what sequence. This information can be used with the raw computer data to 
verify that the material was in the correct place at the correct time. Unfortunately, there is 
little information describing what type of material was in the tanks at that time.  
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Strip Charts 
Strip charts recorded analog readings of many tanks, valves and other operating 
vessels. Charts relating to campaigns 38 and 40 are available in hard copy at the INL’s record 
storage facility. A discussion of the difficulty of working with these charts is presented below 
under expected challenges. 
 
Process Manuals 
Several manuals and reports describing the ICPP and its operations in detail have also 
been found, which, although they will not be fully included in the data package, are useful in 
describing key areas of interest within the plant. Among these include the Precision 
Level/Density Scanner report, several annual reports and fuel campaign reviews, a Failure 
Rate Database, the Users Guide to the PMCS and manuals for plant operators.  
 
Other Data 
More data are available to be collected at a later time, such as 1986 Fuel 
Reprocessing Data Sheets, Fuel Process Logs, R.C. Maurer’s 1982 log book, INTEC 
Analytical Lab logbooks, Batch Transfer Records and other miscellaneous run plans.   
 
Operator Use 
The most important use of the PMCS data was interactive analysis of process 
information. Safeguards, operating, and support staffs had access to this retrievable 
information in the form of tables, graphs, calculations and pre-printed forms. Digital process 
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data were significant improvements over the analog strip charts previously used to do 
statistical testing and process monitoring. 
From an operating standpoint, the PMCS helped to reduce the number of inadvertent 
transfers in the ICPP. The system would calculate the amount of headroom available in the 
next vessel in the process in order to ensure that there was enough room for the additional 
fluid. It would also calculate target values that would inform the operator when the transfer 
from one vessel to another was completed. Transfer routes were checked to ensure that there 
were no conflicts in the process, such as a closed valve when it should be open. To flag 
conflicting requirements in plant operation, a conflict report was printed describing the 
problem and possible correctional procedures. Operators also printed pre and post-transfer 
forms to ensure that the material was sent and received correctly. Of the 12,000 transfers that 
occurred in the plant up to 1989, there were only three inadvertent transfers of material. Of 
these three, none of them were attributable to a failure by the PMCS. All three were a result 
of equipment or other failures in the facility. This fact is a strong proponent of how a similar 
process monitoring system can both help with nuclear safeguards and facility efficiency. 
The ICPP Safeguards staff had 5 main material balance areas in the ICPP called Sub-
Material Balance Areas (Sub-MBAs): Dissolution Headends, First Cycle Extraction, Second 
and Third Cycle Extraction, Product Denitration and Salvage/Low-Level Waste. Using a 
special subset of PMCS data, Safeguards personnel could monitor the movement of solution 
into and out of each Sub-MBA, movement of solution within a Sub-MBA, or any mixing or 
sampling that would occur in the Sub-MBA. They were responsible for ensuring operating 
procedures were being followed. Forms provided on a daily basis reported process events, 
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instruments that lost connection with the computer and summaries of the status of the data 
acquisition devices. 
  
 
Data Congruity Issues 
The current metadata cover campaigns 38 and 40, which spans September 1982 
through January 1983 and September 1985 through January 1986 respectively. Any metadata 
after January 1986 are currently unattainable. The raw digital data on the other hand, cover 
October 1986 through April 1996. Because of the infeasibility of storing that amount of 
information in the early 1980’s, computerized data do not exist before October 1986. 
Therefore, the only available PMCS data before October of 1986 are in strip chart form. 
The information that these strip charts contain is undeniably valuable; however, 
converting them from lines on charts to digital information would require an accurate strip 
chart reader. Once digital readouts were obtained, still more problems ensue. There seems to 
be a different nomenclature on these strip charts than the raw data. So, not only would the 
strip charts require deciphering the nomenclature, but also deciphering units of measurement 
and time intervals between measurements. These charts have little to no labels describing 
these aspects. Possibly the most deterring factor is the observation that the lines on these 
charts are thick enough that when digitized, the data will have a much larger margin of error 
than the raw data already in digital format.    
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